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I. INTRODUCTION
The merger of courts of law and equity has left an enduring legacy of
debate about the survival of equitable doctrines in merged judicial systems. The
debate usually focuses on two distinct-but related-issues: first, whether the
particular equitable doctrine in fact survives as positive law after merger; and
second, whether any policies served by the doctrine justify its survival on nor-
mative grounds in a merged legal system. The traditional requirement that
damages be inadequate' for the equitable remedy of specific performance pro-
vides an excellent illustration of the positive and normative aspects of this de-
bate. A leading remedies scholar has recently concluded, based on an exhaustive
survey of modern cases, that inadequacy of damages is no longer a requirement
for equitable relief and that invocation of the adequacy doctrine usually masks
a different, more persuasive reason for the court's holding.2 Another commenta-
tor has argued, almost as recently, that the adequacy doctrine remains impor-
tant after merger as a means of assessing the strength of the plaintiff's interest
in obtaining equitable relief. This interest is then balanced against possible in-
terests of the defendant and of the legal system in limiting the plaintiff to dam-
ages as the remedy for breach.3 The adequacy test has also sparked a lively
normative debate, with some commentators criticizing the doctrine on grounds
of fairness or efficiency, 4 and others arguing just as strenuously that the doc-
trine is fair or efficient.5
In addition to the adequacy requirement, a claim for specific performance
traditionally had to overcome a series of defenses that did not exist at law (or
were broader than comparable legal defenses) and that rested in the sound dis-
cretion of the Chancellor.6 Like the adequacy doctrine, equitable defenses have
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. The author thanks Professors Robert M. Byrn,
Richard A. Epstein, E. Allan Farnsworth, Douglas Laycock, Joseph M. Perillo, and Steve Thel for helpful com-
ments on a draft of this Article.
1. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981) ("[s]pecific performance or an injunction
will not be ordered if damages would be adequate to protect the expectation interest of the injured party").
2. See generally Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REv. 688 (1990).
3. See E. YORIO. CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS § 2.3, at 34; § 2.5, at
41 (1989). See also Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1365,
1370-76 (1982) (courts balance interests of the promise, the promisor, and the legal system in adjudicating
claims to specific relief).
4. See generally Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Re-
statement, 81 COLUM. L REv. 111 (1981); Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE LJ. 271
(1979); Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH.
L. REV. 341 (1984).
5. See generally Bishop, The Choice of Remedy for Breach of Contract, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1985);
Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 351 (1978); Muris, The Costs of Freely Granting Specific
Performance, 1982 DUKE Li. 1053; Yorio, supra note 3.
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrS § 364 (1981) (specific performance or an injunction may be
denied on the grounds of unfairness resulting in hardship).
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been criticized as anachronisms in a post-merger legal universe.' In contrast
with the adequacy doctrine, however, equitable defenses have found few modern
supporters.
This Article explores separate equitable defenses from both positive and
normative perspectives and concludes that a powerful case can be made for
their continued viability in a merged legal system." Part II briefly describes the
substantive content of equitable defenses and uses an example from a modern
case to dramatize the troublesome issues raised by the existence of separate
defenses to equitable relief. Part III discusses criticisms leveled by modern
scholars against equitable defenses on grounds of morality and efficiency. As
with the adequacy doctrine, one theme of the critics is that separate equitable
defenses have not survived as positive law after the merger of law and equity.
Part IV points out that the noneconomic case against equitable defenses
rests on two contradictory and extreme premises regarding the consequences of
a successful equitable defense. Neither of these premises takes into account a
real world in which the possible sequels (or preludes') to an equitable defense
are far more subtle and complex. Part V exposes other flaws in the case against
separate defenses to equitable relief. Part VI shows that equitable defenses play
a useful role in a merged legal system by mediating between the extremes of
specific performance and rescission as outcomes in actions for breach of
contract.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
A party aggrieved by a breach of contract may seek equitable relief in the
form of specific performance or an injunction to remedy the wrong. According
to the Second Restatement of Contracts, a contract will not be specifically en-
forced if damages would be adequate, 10 if the terms of the contract are not
sufficiently certain to devise an appropriate order,' or if the burden of enforcing
or supervising a court order would exceed the benefit to be gained and the harm
prevented by specific enforcement. 2 Even if the plaintiff overcomes these obsta-
cles, a court has discretion to deny specific relief on the ground of an equitable
defense.' 3 Various factors may give rise to a successful equitable defense: im-
proper conduct by the plaintiff in the formation of the contract; 4 unreasonable
7. See infra text accompanying notes 43-46 (discussion of criticism that with the merger of law and equity
separate equitable defenses are an anachronism).
8. Portions of this Article draw upon material treated in Chapter 4 of E. Yoito, supra note 3.
9. The existence of equitable defenses may affect pre-litigation bargaining between the parties to settle their
dispute. See infra text accompanying notes 166-69. Thus, it is necessary to consider not only sequels to a success-
ful equitable defense, but also preludes in the form of negotiated settlements.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981). But see Laycock, supra note 2 (inadequacy of
damages is no longer a requirement for equitable relief).
11. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 362 (1981).
12. Id. at § 366.
13. See id. at § 364 (specific performance or an injunction may he denied on the grounds of unfairness which
would result in hardship).
14. See, e.g., Perlmutter v. Bacas, 219 Md. 406, 149 A.2d 23 (1959) (misrepresentation by plaintiff as to
access road); Eisenbeis v. Shillington, 349 Mo. 108, 159 S.W.2d 641 (1941) (misrepresentation by plaintiff's agent
as to restrictive covenant).
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delay by the plaintiff in instituting or pursuing an action for specific relief;15
inadequacy of consideration;"" impossibility;1 mistake;' 8 changed circum-
stances;19 hardship on the defendant; 20 injury to third parties or the public;" or
some combination of these circumstances. 2
Some equitable defenses (such as inadequacy of consideration) have legal
analogues (i.e., unconscionability) that may also prevent the plaintiff from re-
covering damages. 3 But what distinguishes equitable defenses is that they
sometimes operate to preclude specific relief while leaving the plaintiff free to
pursue a claim to damages. This aspect of the doctrine of equitable defenses has
provoked the severest criticism from modern commentators: why, they ask, does
the legal system permit damages to be awarded for breach of a contract that
the system refuses, for moral reasons, to enforce specifically?24
15. See, e.g., Miller v. Bloomberg, 126 Ill. App. 3d 332, 466 N.E.2d 1342 (1984) (delay by plaintiff in
seeking to enforce order of specific performance).
16. See, e.g., Gabrielson v. Hogan, 298 F. 722 (8th Cir. 1924) (specific performance denied against buyer of
land because contract price was one-third more than value); Marks v. Gates, 154 F. 481 (9th Cir. 1907) (specific
performance denied on ground that consideration of about $12,000 was grossly less than the value of defendant's
return promise).
17. See, e.g., Braaten v. Midwest Farm Shows, 360 N.W.2d 455 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (specific perform-
ance of partnership agreement could not be compelled because of each partner's right to terminate the partnership
at will); Lewis v. City of Washington, 63 N.C. App. 552, 305 S.E.2d 752, modified on other grounds, 309 N.C.
818, 310 S.E.2d 610 (1983) (zoning restriction prohibited specific performance of contract terms).
18. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Frawley, 112 Kan. 124, 210 P. 482 (1922) (buyer's mathematical error in comput-
ing price ground for denying specific performance); King v. Oxford, 282 S.C. 307, 318 S.E.2d 125 (Ct. App.
1984) (mistake as to net asset value ground for denying buyer's claim to specific performance).
19. See, e.g., Bergstedt v. Bender, 222 S.W. 547 (Tex. Comm. App. 1920) (death of promisor soon after
execution of the contract); Clay v. Landreth, 187 Va. 169, 45 S.E.2d 875 (1948) (specific performance denied
because rezoning prevented defendant from building plant on subject property).
20. See, e.g., 3615 Corp. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 717 F.2d 1236 (8th Cir. 1983) (specific performance
will not be decreed if it would work disproportionate hardship on the defendant); Smith v. Meyers, 130 Md. 64,
99 A. 938 (1917) (cost to defendant of specific performance far in excess of benefit to the plaintiff); Patel v. Ali,
[1984] 1 Ch. 283, 1 All E.R. 978 (illness, bankruptcy, and imprisonment in defendant's family after execution of
contract make specific performance overly harsh).
21. See, e.g., Rockhill Tennis Club v. Volker, 331 Mo. 947, 56 S.W.2d 9 (1932) (specific performance denied
because of public interest in use of subject property as part of museum grounds); Hawks v. Sparks, 204 Va. 717,
133 S.E.2d 536 (1963) (specific performance denied to prevent petitioner from partitioning property to detriment
of minors).
22. See, e.g., Brooks v. Towson Realty Co., 223 Md. 61, 162 A.2d 431 (1960) (misunderstanding by defend-
ant and inadequacy of consideration); Hoover v. Wright, 202 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1947) (incapacity of promisor and
inadequacy); Public Water Supply Dist. v. Fowlkes, 407 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966) (delay by plaintiff in
bringing suit and mistake by defendant); In re Estate of Mihm, 345 Pa. Super. 1, 497 A.2d 612 (1985) (abuse of
confidential relationship and inadequacy); McKinnon v. Benedict, 38 Wis. 2d 607, 157 N.W.2d 665 (1968) (supe-
rior bargaining position of plaintiff and hardship of injunction on defendant).
23. See E. FARNSWORTH. Co r cTs §§ 4.28, 9.1-9.9 (1982) (analysis of legal defenses of unconscionability,
mistake, impossibility, and frustration of purpose).
24. See, e.g., Chafee, Coming into Equity with Clean Hands (pt. 2), 47 MiCH. L. Rav. 1065, 1096 (1949)
[hereinafter Chafee II] (law and equity should not have different standards of morality); Dawson, Specific Per-
formance in France and Germany, 57 MiCH. L. REv. 495, 535-36 (1959) (separate equitable defenses produce
double standard of morality and fail to alleviate hardship or discourage sharp bargaining if damages are awarded
anyway); Frank & Endicott, Defenses in Equity and "'Legal Rights," 14 LA. L. REV. 380, 389-90 (1954) (sepa-
rate equitable defenses are a myth that may lead to injustice); Newman, The Renaissance of Good Faith in
Contracting in American Law, 54 CORNELL L. RaV. 553, 557-58 (1969) (to award damages when specific relief is
denied may be unfair to defendant); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 298-303 (separate equitable defenses produce
confusion, uncertainty, and inefficiency); Comment, Equitable Contract Remedies-Denial of Both Specific Per-
formance and Rescission, 32 MICH. L. REv. 518, 525 (1934) (differences in legal and equitable defenses produce
double standard of morality and are senseless after merger of law and equity).
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As an illustration of the strength of this argument, consider the facts of
Hilton v. Nelsen." The defendant agreed to sell his Minnesota farm to the
plaintiff, a Missouri real estate investor, for $180,000. The contract provided
that, in the case of default by the buyer, the seller's sole remedy would be reten-
tion of an earnest money deposit of $2,500; in the case of breach by the seller,
the buyer would be entitled, if he chose, to specific performance. Shortly before
the date set for closing, the seller repudiated and the buyer brought suit for
specific performance, which was granted by the trial court.2 6
On appeal, the decision was reversed, and the case remanded for a determi-
nation of the buyer's damages at law.27 In denying specific performance, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota relied on the following facts: the contract was
drafted by the buyer's attorney; it contained elements of unfairness or over-
reaching (the limitation imposed on the seller's remedy, the buyer's unilateral
right to terminate for various reasons, and extremely generous payment terms);
and the seller had not been represented by a lawyer at the signing and had
misunderstood basic terms of the agreement. 28 Taken together, these circum-
stances constituted a defense to specific performance.29
The pattern of Hilton v. Nelsen recurs in many reported cases: the plaintiff
asserts a claim for which specific performance would normally lie;30 the defend-
ant seeks to dismiss the claim on the ground of an equitable defense; and the
court accepts the discretionary defense and denies the equitable remedy.3' More
interesting than this scenario is its sequel. Deprived of specific performance, the
buyer may press an alternative claim for damages. Normally a promisee ag-
grieved by a breach of contract is entitled to expectation damages-that is,
damages that put the promisee in the position in which she would have been
had the promisor performed.3 2 In the case of a breach by a seller of real estate,
expectation damages would be measured by the difference between the market
price of the property at the time of breach and the contract price,33 a formula
25. 283 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1979).
26. Id. at 880.
27. Id. at 883-84.
28. Id. at 881-83.
29. In denying specific performance, the court also relied on the buyer's investment motive, noting that dam-
ages were adequate because any other Minnesota farm land would serve as a comparable investment vehicle. Id.
at 881. But the court strongly suggested that the presence of an investment motive would not in itself be sufficient
to deny specific performance, see id. at 883, and expressly limited its holding to the narrow facts of the case. Id.
But for the equitable defense, therefore, it seems likely that the buyer would have obtained specific performance.
30. A buyer of real estate normally is entitled to specific performance against a breaching seller. E. Yoio,
supra note 3, § 10.2.1.
31. The court in Hilton did not place labels on the equitable defenses that barred the buyer from obtaining
specific performance. The defense based on overreaching by the buyer might be categorized as "unfairness." See
id. § 5.4.1. The defense based on the particular terms slanted in the buyer's favor might be labeled "inadequacy of
consideration." See id. § 5.4.3.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTR crs § 347 (1981) ("the injured party has a right to damages
based on his expectation interest"); id. § 347 comment a (expectation damages "are intended to give him (i.e., the
promisee] the benefit of bargain .... ").
33. Assume for example, using the facts in Hilton, that the market value of the land was $250,000 on the
date of breach. Had the seller performed, the buyer would have acquired land worth S250,000 for $180,000,
producing a net monetary gain of $70,000. An award of damages measured by the difference ($70,000) between
the market price ($250,000) and the contract price ($180,000) enables the buyer to pocket the same monetary
gain.
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endorsed by the court in Hilton v. Nelsen.3 4 If, for example, the market value of
the farm land was determined to be $250,000 on the date of breach, the buyer
would recover $70,000 in expectation damages on remand.3 5
Outcomes such as this trouble critics of equitable defenses, who argue that
the weakness of the plaintiff's case makes it unfair to require the defendant to
pay the monetary equivalent of performance as damages.3 6 Some of these critics
also object that the legal system is applying a double standard of morality in
adjudicating claims to equitable and legal relidf. 3 Other critics argue that
courts in fact ignore the distinction between equitable and legal defenses by
using the same conduct or facts to rescind the contract and deny the plaintiff a
recovery of money damages.3 8 Even without rescinding the contract, the effect
of denying specific relief may be to deprive the plaintiff of any effective rem-
edy.39 The resulting practical equivalence of equitable and legal defenses under-
mines the charge of a double standard of morality, but at the price of a conflict
between legal theory and the practical consequences of separate equitable de-
fenses. Part III explores more fully these and other arguments for abolishing
separate defenses to equitable relief.
III. THE CASE AGAINST EQUITABLE DEFENSES
A. Historical and Moral Criticisms
In the early history of the office, the English Chancellor was almost always
an ecclesiastic.40 Partly as a result of his religious background, the Chancellor
developed a method of adjudicating disputes on the basis of equitable or moral,
Computing damages as of the date of breach prevents the buyer from recovering damages for any apprecia-
tion in the value of the land between the date of breach and the date of judgment. See infra text accompanying
notes 97-101.
34. See Hilton, 283 N.W.2d at 884 n.5.
Other jurisdictions reject expectation as the measure of damages for breach by a seller of a real estate
contract in certain cases, and instead limit the buyer's monetary recovery to restitution of any downpayment and
reliance damages. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 839-40 (loss-of-bargain damages for breach of realty
contract precluded in England and certain American states).
35. The amount that the buyer in Hilton would recover as damages on remand depends on the trier-of-fact's
assessment of the market value of the property. If the trier-of-fact is unsympathetic to the buyer's claim, it might
underassess the amount of damages. See infra text accompanying notes 146-60.
36. See, e.g., Dawson, supra note 24, at 535-36 (equitable defenses fail to alleviate hardship or discourage
sharp bargaining if damages are awarded anyway); Newman, supra note 24, at 557-58 (an award of damages
may cause extreme hardship to the defendant); Comment, supra note 24, at 525-26 (legal remedies may be as
harsh as specific performance).
37. Dawson, supra note 24, at 535-36 (equitable defenses involve double standard of morality); Comment,
supra note 24, at 525 (double standard of morality makes no sense after the merger of law and equity).
38. See Chafee, Coming into Equity with Clean Hands (pt. 1), 47 MICH. L. REv. 877, 893 (1949) [hereinaf-
ter Chafee I] (equitable defense leads to rescission of the contract); Frank & Endicott, supra note 24, at 381
(empirical evidence that defeat in equity amounts to a total defeat); Newman, supra note 24, at 557-58 (after
merger of law and equity, doctrine holding equitable plaintiff to a higher standard is no longer valid). Cf Chafec
II, supra note 24, at 1096 (impossible to believe that the same judges, sitting in equity and at law, have different
senses of morality).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 58-61.
40. G. KEaTON & L SHERIDAN. EQurY 3, 33 (3d ed. 1987); F. MAITLA D, EQurY 2 (2d ed. 1936).
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rather than strictly legal, principles."1 As a court of conscience, the Chancellor
entertained defenses to equitable relief that common law judges would not ac-
cept as defenses to claims for money damages in the courts of law.42
Two subsequent historical developments have led commentators to con-
clude that separate equitable defenses are now an anachronism. 4 First, Anglo-
American Chancellors have long been secular, drawn generally from the same
pool as common law judges.44 Second, law and equity have merged in many
jurisdictions, with the consequence that the very same judge decides both equi-
table and legal claims. For that judge to apply different standards of morality
depending on the hat she wears seems indefensible. 45 If the judge permits dam-
ages to be recovered in lieu of specific relief, equitable defenses may fail in their
purpose of alleviating hardship on the defendant or discouraging sharp tactics
by the plaintiff.46
B. Economic Criticisms
In an important article, Professor Alan Schwartz has presented the most
specific and sophisticated arguments from an economic perspective for abolish-
ing separate equitable defenses. 47 He assesses the efficiency of these defenses in
terms of two different criteria: first, their effect on competitive prices;48 and
second, their effect on the costs of judicial administration. 49 With respect to the
first criterion, Schwartz argues that a defense that leads to more competitive
prices is efficient; a defense that leads to higher prices is inefficient.50 Schwartz
concludes that certain procedural defenses (such as misrepresentation) may be
justifiable because they improve the bargaining process and lead to more com-
petitive prices. 51 Defenses that are based solely on substantive unfairness with-
41. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 821 (Chancellor was expected to act according to conscience); G.
KEETON & L. SHERIDAN, supra note 40, at 3 (equity founded on reason and conscience); F. MAITLAND, supra
note 40, at 8 (Chancellors did not consider themselves bound by precedent); J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQusTy
JURISPRUDENCE § 35 (5th ed. S. Symons 1941) (principles upon which Chancellor's decisions were based were
honesty, equity, and conscience).
During the sixteenth century, equitable principles began to become fixed as a body of rules. See P. BAKER &
P. LANGAN, SNELL'S PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 9 (28th ed. 1982); F. MAITLAND, supra note 40, at 9.
42. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 837 (discretionary defenses developed from historical origin of
equity as a court of conscience).
43. See Chafee I, supra note 38, at 895 (with the merger of law and equity, issue should be the same with
respect to legal and equitable relief); Dawson, supra note 24, at 536 (double standard of morality has survived
long after secularization of the role of the Chancellor); Comment, supra note 24, at 525 (double standard of
morality makes no sense after merger of law and equity).
44. See G. KEETON & L. SHERIDAN, supra note 40, at 3 ("[a]t the close of the middle ages the Chancellor
ceased to be a cleric and by the seventeenth century he was almost invariably a lawyer"); F. MAITLAND, supra
note 40, at 9 ("[i]n the second half of the sixteenth century... [tihe day for ecclesiastical Chancellors is passing
away"); Dawson, supra note 24, at 536 (the Chancellors have "long . . . laid aside their ecclesiastical robes").
45. See Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 28 (1950) ("Why should the same judges be very moral in a
specific performance suit and brutally mathematical in a damage suit?").
46. Dawson, supra note 24, at 535-36. See also Newman, supra note 24, at 557-58 (award of damages may
impose extreme hardship on the defendant).
47. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 298-303.
48. Id. at 300.
49. Id. at 300, 303.
50. Id. at 300.
51. Id.
1206 [Vol. 51:1201
EQUITABLE DEFENSES
out any evidence of procedural irregularity (such as inadequacy of considera-
tion) are inefficient because they deter buyers from seeking out good deals.5 2 As
comparison-shopping by buyers decreases, sellers have less reason to reduce
prices to a competitive level. Because of their effect in increasing prices,
Schwartz concludes that substantive equitable defenses ought to be abolished.58
Although certain process-based defenses to equitable relief have a positive
economic effect by keeping prices lower, Schwartz faults the legal system for
making these defenses broader than their analogues at law.54 Differences be-
tween legal and equitable defenses generate confusion and make the legal out-
come unpredictable.5 5 As a consequence, defendants frequently assert equitable
defenses and courts are forced to spend greater time and resources in adjudicat-
ing contractual disputes.5 6 Schwartz also argues that the existence of separate
equitable defenses causes sharp discontinuities in outcome without normative
justification: when damages are provable, the plaintiff who is denied equitable
relief can enforce the contract at law; when damages are uncertain, the plaintiff
may be denied any remedy for the breach.57
C. The "Death" of Separate Equitable Defenses
In a 1954 article, Frank and Endicott concluded that a plaintiff who is
denied relief in equity on the ground of an equitable defense rarely succeeds in
recovering money damages at law.58 The authors offered several explanations
for the inability of plaintiffs to obtain monetary relief: the existence of an iden-
tical legal defense; a procedural bar to a legal claim (such as the Statute of
Limitations); or a practical obstacle to recovering damages (such as the defend-
ant's insolvency) 9 A 1969 article addressed the same issue by focusing primar-
ily on reported cases in merged legal systems.6 0 The author's findings suggest
that the trend toward practical equivalence of equitable and legal defenses may
have accelerated as a result of the merger of law and equity: only two cases
were found in which the plaintiff recovered damages after equitable relief was
denied.61
Taken together, these articles announce what appears to be the death of
separate equitable defenses.62 Frank and Endicott argue that divergence be-
tween the theory and reality of equitable defenses misleads courts and litigants
and creates the risk of legal error when a judge denies equitable relief in the
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 300-01.
55. Id. at 301.
56. Id. at 300. Cf. Laycock, supra note 2, at 769 (survival in theory of irreparable injury rule forces litigants
and courts to expend additional resources).
57. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 299-300.
58. Frank & Endicott, supra note 24, at 389-90.
59. Id. at 382-88.
60. Newman, supra note 24.
61. Id. at 559.
62. Frank & Endicott, supra note 24, at 389 (equitable defenses are a myth); Newman, supra note 24, at
557-58 (equitable defenses no longer represent true state of the law).
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erroneous belief that damages will be awarded instead.6 3 Professor Douglas
Laycock argues in a related context that the survival in theory of an equitable
doctrine that is practically moribund needlessly consumes time and resources as
litigants and courts struggle to find reasons not to apply the doctrine to the facts
of the particular case.6 4 If separate equitable defenses are in fact dead, these
arguments constitute a powerful case for changing legal theory to dispel the
illusion that a plaintiff may recover compensatory damages after dismissal of
her equitable claim.6"
D. Summary
Critics of equitable defenses on historical or moral grounds would change
what they perceive to be the positive law by subjecting claims to damages to the
same standards of morality as claims to equitable relief. Legal economists also
urge reform of the positive law to make equitable and legal defenses equivalent,
but primarily by narrowing (or eliminating) defenses to equitable relief. Still
other critics believe that equitable and legal defenses are already practically
equivalent, but fault legal theory for lagging behind the positive law. All the
critics agree on one point: legal and equitable defenses ought to be identical,
whether or not they already are.
IV. SEQUELS (OR PRELUDES) TO AN EQUITABLE DEFENSE
Two antithetical and extreme premises underlie the noneconomic case
against separate equitable defenses. One set of arguments assumes that equita-
ble defenses remain broader than their legal counterparts despite the merger of
law and equity and that a plaintiff denied specific relief on the ground of an
equitable defense will recover the monetary equivalent of performance as dam-
ages.66 Another set of arguments rests on claims that equitable and legal de-
fenses are in practice identical in merged judicial systems and that a plaintiff
denied specific relief will fail to obtain any other remedy for the breach.67
Both of these premises cannot simultaneously be true. In fact, neither is a
complete picture of the consequences to litigants of the existence of separate
defenses to equitable relief. Between the extremes of full expectation damages
for the breach and rescission of the contract lie a vast array of intermediate
outcomes. A survey of possible sequels (or preludes) to a successful equitable
defense will expose flaws in the premises underlying the noneconomic case
against separate equitable defenses.6 8
63. Frank & Endicott, supra note 24, at 389.
64. Laycock, supra note 2, at 769 (irreparable injury rule generates costs in trying to fit the case within the
numerous exceptions that have swallowed the rule).
65. See Frank & Endicott, supra note 24, at 389-90. Cf. Laycock, supra note 2, at 768-71 (courts should
eschew the covert tool of the irreparable injury rule in favor of an open discussion of the reasons for denying
equitable relief).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
67. See supra text accompanying notes 58-65.
68. The economic case against separate equitable defenses rests on different-but also flawed-premises. See
infra text accompanying notes 187-94 (economic arguments for abolishing separate equitable defenses ignore the
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A. Alternatives to Expectation Damages
Although expectation is the normal measure of damages for breach of con-
tract, 9 the Second Restatement of Contracts recognizes two other possible mea-
sures of recovery against the breaching party: reliance damages and restitu-
tion.70 Reliance damages are designed to put the injured party in the same
position as if the contract had not been made by reimbursing for any loss
caused by reliance on the contract .7  Restitution is designed to prevent unjust
enrichment by requiring the party in breach to restore any benefit conferred by
the injured party in part performance or reliance on the contract.7 1
A simple hypothetical will help to illustrate the differences among these
remedies. In a detailed written agreement, S agrees to sell a parcel of land to B
for $200,000. Pursuant to the agreement, B makes an immediate downpayment
of $20,000. The agreement is contingent upon B's obtaining bank financing for
seventy-five percent of the purchase price at an interest rate of ten percent or
lower and requires that B make good-faith efforts to obtain a mortgage. In reli-
ance on the agreement, B pays a standard fee of $1000 for a mortgage applica-
tion. After the bank gives B a mortgage commitment, S repudiates the agree-
ment. B brings suit requesting specific performance or monetary relief for S's
refusal to convey the land; S answers by alleging circumstances that might con-
stitute an equitable defense.
This scenario gives rise to five possible remedies: 1) specific performance;
2) expectation damages computed to give B the benefit of the bargain;73 3)
restitution of $20,000, the amount of the downpayment made by B to S pursu-
ant to the agreement; 4) reliance damages of $1000, the expense incurred by B
in applying for a mortgage in reliance on the contract; or, 5) both restitution of
$20,000 and reliance damages of $1000. If a court decides to deny specific per-
formance on the ground of an equitable defense, it need not award B benefit-of-
the-bargain damages, but may instead limit B's recovery to restitution, to reli-
ance damages, or to both.7 4 Depending on the facts of the particular case, a
benefit of having a more responsive legal system and posit unrealistic behavior by buyers in response to equitable
defenses).
69. See supra text accompanying note 32.
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 349, 373(1) (1981). The Restatement also authorizes the
recovery of the amount provided in a valid liquidated damages clause. See id. § 356. For an overview of contract
remedies, see Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145 (1970).
71. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 344(b), 349 (1981). The classic analysis of reliance
damages is Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE LJ. 52 & 373
(1936 & 1937).
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(c), 373(1) (1981). For further analysis of restitution
in the contractual context, see Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle
in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE LJ. 1339 (1985); Perillo, Restitution in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81
COLUM. L. REv. 37 (1981); Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1208 (1973).
73. Assuming that B establishes that the market value of the land is $275,000, she has a claim to a recovery
of S95,000. That amount gives her the benefit of the bargain: she would have realized a net monetary gain of
S95,000 if S had performed by conveying land worth S275,000 for the balance ($180,000) of the purchase price.
See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 844-48 (discussion of general measure of expectation damages).
74. See, e.g., Banaghan v. Malaney, 200 Mass. 46, 49-50, 85 N.E. 839, 840 (1908) (nonbreaching party
entitled to reliance damages for "losses . . . sustained"); Buckley v. Patterson, 39 Minn. 250, 39 N.W. 490
(1888) (trial court should award restitution, not benefit-of-the-bargain damages, after denial of specific perform-
ance); Lewis v. City of Washington, 309 N.C. 818, 310 S.E.2d 610, modifying 63 N.C. App. 552, 305 S.E.2d 752
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court may have other remedial alternatives.7 5 If, for example, the contract in
dispute contains a liquidated damages provision, damages may be awarded in
the stipulated amount.7 6
B. Limitations on Damages
After denying specific performance on the ground of an equitable defense,
a court may decide that the facts entitle the plaintiff to expectation damages
rather than some lesser remedy (such as reliance damages or restitution).
Though designed in theory to give the plaintiff the benefit of the bargain,77
expectation damages sometimes fall short of the monetary equivalent of per-
formance because claims to damages must satisfy three requirements: mitiga-
tion, foreseeability, and certainty.7 8 Of these requirements, mitigation and cer-
tainty recur most often as practical obstacles to plaintiffs seeking damages after
specific performance has been denied.7 1
1. Mitigation of Damages
The Second Restatement of Contracts provides that "damages are not re-
coverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk,
burden, or humiliation." 8 This rule, which is known as the doctrine of mitiga-
tion of damages, has two branches. Under the negative branch, the aggrieved
party is generally expected to cease performance upon breach or repudiation in
order to avoid further costs.81 Under the positive branch, the injured party is
expected in certain circumstances to take affirmative steps to reduce the loss
(1983) (plaintiff entitled to restitution of rental payments after denial of specific performance of lease); King v.
Oxford, 282 S.C. 307, 315, 318 S.E.2d 125, 130 (Ct. App. 1984) (buyer of corporate stock denied specific per-
formance, but entitled to recover any nonspeculative reliance damages).
If the plaintiff passed up another opportunity in reliance on the contract with the defendant, reliance damages
theoretically include any profit lost on the foregone opportunity. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 71, at 60-61.
75. See, e.g., Kleinberg v. Ratett, 252 N.Y. 236, 169 N.E. 289 (1929) (seller denied specific performance,
but allowed to retain downpayment made by buyer).
76. See Sumner v. Bankhead, 119 S.C. 78, 111 S.E. 891 (1922) (seller allowed to retain downpayment
pursuant to liquidated damages clause after denial of specific performance on ground of equitable defense).
77. See supra text accompanying note 32.
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 350-52 (1981).
79. The discussion in the text is limited to the mitigation and certainty requirements because the foreseeabil-
ity doctrine rarely appears in the reported cases as a practical limitation on damages after specific performance is
denied. At the risk of some oversimplication, the foreseeability requirement may be summarized as absolving the
breaching party of liability for damages that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time the contract was consum-
mated. See id. § 351. It is possible, in theory, that this requirement may have a serious negative effect on a
plaintiff's claim to damages after specific performance has been denied on the ground of an equitable defense.
Suppose, for example, that a buyer agrees to pay $250,000 for a parcel of real estate which she expects to develop
in an unspecified way and from which she hopes to make a net profit of $100,000. If the seller repudiates and
specific performance is denied on the ground of an equitable defense, the buyer may seek to be compensated for
the loss of net profit caused by the breach. If the profit was unforeseeable at the time of contract, the buyer may
be precluded from a recovery in that amount by the foresecability doctrine.
80. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (1981).
81. See Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929) (contractor denied costs
incurred in constructing a bridge after repudiation by government entity); Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio 317 (N.Y.
1845) (restorer denied damages for expenses incurred after owner of painting repudiated contract); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 comment a (1981) (nonbreaching party "is ordinarily expected to stop his own
performance to avoid further expenditure").
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caused by a breach. 2 If the injured party fails to satisfy either branch of the
doctrine, damages are reduced to the extent that the loss could have been
avoided.8
The positive branch of the mitigation doctrine operates as the implicit
foundation of many of the standard formulas for computing contract damages.
In the case of fungible goods, for example, one measure of damages against a
seller in breach is the difference between the market price on the date that the
buyer learned of the breach and the contract price.84 By depriving the buyer of
damages for any subsequent price increase, this formula betrays an implicit pre-
mise that the buyer is expected to mitigate by covering in the market upon
learning of the breach.85 The effect of the formula-and of the mitigation doc-
trine in general-is to place the risk of subsequent market fluctuations on the
injured party.88
A party seeking specific performance usually will not take the steps neces-
sary to satisfy the positive branch of the mitigation doctrine. Because she ex-
pects the party in breach ultimately to perform, she has no reason to engage a
market replacement. Moreover, her claim to specific performance generally de-
pends on inadequacy of damages (at least compared to the equitable remedy).87
Often the reason damages would be inadequate is the lack of an available sub-
stitute on the market.88 What establishes a prima facie claim to specific per-
formance (irreplaceability on the market) makes it difficult, if not impossible,
for the injured party to take affirmative steps to reduce the loss caused by the
breach. 80
With this background, it is possible to understand the relationship between
the mitigation doctrine and equitable defenses. If specific performance is denied
82. See Jameson v. Board of Education, 78 W. Va. 612, 89 S.E. 255 (1916) (wrongfully discharged employee
expected to accept comparable service to minimize the loss in earnings caused by breach); RESTATEMENT (SEc-
oND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 350 comment b (1981) (injured party "expected to take such affirmative steps as are
appropriate" to avoid loss); Id. § 350, illustration 5 (buyer denied damages that could have been prevented by
acquiring substitute machine); id. § 350, illustration 6 (farmer denied damages for loss of a crop preventable by
engagement of replacement for breaching farmhand).
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 comment b (1981) (amount of avoidable loss is de-
ducted from the amount otherwise recoverable as damages).
84. See U.C.C. § 2-713(1). If the buyer has actually covered by purchasing substitute goods, damages are
measured by difference between the cost of cover and the contract price. Id. §§ 2-711(1)(a); 2-712(2). See also
Gabrielson v. Hogan, 298 F. 722 (8th Cir. 1924) (contract price/market price differential determined on the date
of breach of real estate contract).
85. See Weathersby v. Gore, 556 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1977) (buyer can protect herself by acquiring good in
the market at the time of breach).
86. This effect is demonstrated by the leading nineteenth century case enunciating the date-of-breach
formula for computing damages. See Gainsford v. Carroll, 2 B. & C. 624, 107 Eng. Rep. 516 (K.B. 1828). Upon
default by a seller of bacon, the trial court awarded damages based on the price of bacon at the time of judgment.
On appeal, the court reversed, holding that damages should be assessed at the time of breach, when the price of
bacon was lower, because the buyer was expected to mitigate at that time.
87. See supra text accompanying note 10.
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 360(b) (1981) (difficulty of obtaining a substitute is a
..significant" factor in determining whether damages would be adequate); Laycock, supra note 2, at 691, 703
(modem test of inadequacy of damages is whether the plaintiff can use them to replace the specific thing he has
lost).
89. See E. Yo~io, supra note 3, § 8.2.3.1 (mitigation doctrine and specific performance rest on antithetical
premises regarding the availability of a substitute).
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on the ground of an equitable defense, a court must determine the amount of
damages to award in lieu of the equitable remedy. Rarely will the mitigation
doctrine play an express role in this determination because the injured party
usually has convincing reasons for her failure to mitigateY0 But formulas for
computing damages that derive from the mitigation principle may affect the
damages award indirectly depending on the date selected by the court for as-
sessing the injured party's loss.
Suppose that a seller agrees to sell her home for $100,000. On the date set
by the contract, when the value of the home is $110,000, the seller refuses to
convey a deed to the property. In answer to the buyer's suit for specific perform-
ance, the seller proves that she became seriously ill after the execution of the
contract and that she is now dependent on relatives and neighbors to care for
her children and maintain her home. She argues that an order of specific per-
formance, by forcing her to move, would produce extreme hardship for her and
her family. Although these facts make an appealing case for denying the equita-
ble remedy, damages may be awarded in an amount sufficient, when added to
the contract price, to enable the buyer to acquire a comparable home on the
market.9 If the value of the home has risen to $125,000 by the date of judg-
ment, the buyer would need $25,000 in damages to replace what the seller ref-
uses to convey, however understandably, under the contract.
92
Notice that this outcome involves a suspension of the normal mitigation
principle because damages are computed as of the date of judgment rather than
the date of breach. The effect is to shift the risk of interim appreciation from
the injured party, on whom the mitigation rule normally places the risk, 3 to the
party in breach. Shifting this risk may be justified on the ground that the in-
jured party could not be expected to cover on the date of breach by buying
another home because she had a powerful claim to specific performance, which
was denied for reasons and circumstances beyond her control.94
The date-of-judgment formula will not always benefit the injured party.
Suppose, for example, that the market price of the home declines from
$110,000 to $104,000 between the date of breach and the date of judgment.
Computed on the date of breach, the buyer's damages are $10,000; computed
90. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
91. The hypothetical in the text is based on the facts of Patel v. Ali, [1984] 1 Ch. 283, 1 All E.R. 978, in
which the court denied specific performance of a promise to sell a home for £24,000 on the ground of hardship
and changed circumstances, but ordered the seller to deposit £10,000 as security for buyer's damages. Although
the opinion does not indicate the date on which damages were to be computed, requiring a deposit of £10,000 on a
contract price of £24,000 suggests that the court wanted to ensure that the buyer would be able to acquire a
substitute home in the market.
92. The buyer may take the $25,000 in damages, add it to the contract price of $100,000. and acquire a
comparable home for the market price of $125,000.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
94. See Asamera Oil Corp. v. Sea Oil & Gen. Corp., 1 S.C.R. 633, 668, 89 D.L.R.3d 1, 26 (1979) (buyer
may be relieved from consequences of failure to mitigate if there was a "fair, real and substantial" basis for
specific performance). See also Waddams, The Date for the Assessment of Damages, 97 L.Q.R. 445, 450 (1981)
(damages may be computed as of the date of judgment where buyer has a justifiable claim to specific
performance).
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on the date of judgment, damages are $4000.95 Whenever the property at issue
declines in value, the effect of the date-of-judgment formula is to reduce the
injured party's recovery by the amount of the depreciation. Using the date-of-
judgment formula is proper, however, because it results in an award that is
sufficient to accomplish the objective of enabling the buyer on the judgment
date to purchase a substitute for the home she would have acquired but for the
equitable defense to specific performance.96
A court is likely to take a different view of the appropriate date for com-
puting damages when the reason for denying specific performance is the injured
party's own delay in instituting or pursuing a claim to specific performance.7
Particularly in the case of speculative property, delay by the buyer may be an
attempt to obtain a risk-free hedge." If the property declines in value by the
date of trial, the buyer will seek damages measured by the difference between
the market price on the date of breach and the contract price; if the property
increases in value, the buyer will seek specific performance. 9 When a buyer
awaits the turn of events and seeks specific performance only after a rise in
value, a court may deny the equitable remedy 00 and may limit damages to the
95. The difference between the market and contract price is $10,000 on the date of breach; that difference is
S4000 on the date of judgment.
96. The buyer may take the $4000 recovery, add it to the contract price of $100,000, and purchase a
substitute at the market price of $104,000.
It is possible in certain cases that using the date-of-judgment formula will deprive the buyer of any recovery
for the breach. Suppose in the hypothetical in the text that the property declines in value to $90,000 by the date of
judgment. Because $90,000 is less than the contract price of $100,000, the buyer recovers no damages under a
date-of-judgment formula. Of course, when the property declines in value below the contract price, it is unlikely
that the seller would breach. Breach is conceivable, however, if the seller has personal reasons for refusing to
convey the property. See supra text accompanying notes 90-92. Denying the buyer any recovery under those
circumstances is not unfair because she can acquire a comparable substitute home for less than the contract price.
97. The equitable defense premised on unreasonable delay by the plaintiff is often referred to as "laches."
See, e.g., E YoRio, supra note 3, § 5.7.3. One of the usual requirements for laches is prejudice to the defendant.
See id. § 5.7.1. Arguably, a seller suffers no prejudice from a rise in the value of property beyond having to fulfill
her bargain. See id. § 5.7.3. During the period of the buyer's delay, however, the seller is in an uncertain position,
at risk of market fluctuation in the value of the property and unsure whether to take advantage of other opportuni-
ties with respect to the property. R. SHARPE, INJUNCTIONS AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 43 (1983). This may be
sufficient prejudice to constitute laches. See 11 YoRIo, supra note 3, § 5.7.3. Regardless of whether the prejudice
requirement for laches has been met, courts may deny specific performance if the buyer's delay in seeking specific
performance was designed to take advantage of market fluctuation. See infra sources cited in note 100.
98. See R. SHARPE, supra note 97, at 43 (delay in seeking specific performance may give buyer risk-free
period of speculation at seller's expense).
99. The point in the text may be illustrated mathematically by assuming that the contract price is $100,000
and the market value on the date of breach is $125,000. If the market price declines to $110,000, the buyer will
opt for damages computed as of the date of breach ($25,000) instead of specific performance because the latter
leaves the buyer with a net gain of only $10,000 (the difference between the market value on the date of judgment
and the contract price). If the market price increases to $145,000, the buyer will seek specific performance be-
cause the equitable remedy enables the buyer to pocket a net gain of $45,000 (the difference between the market
value on the date of judgment and the contract price).
100. See, e.g., Miller v. Bloomberg, 126 Ill. App. 3d 332, 466 N.E.2d 1342 (1984) (specific performance
denied where property had appreciated during delay of more than 2 years); Hawks v. Sparks, 204 Va. 717, 133
S.E.2d 536 (1963) (specific performance denied where property had appreciated during five-year delay).
Before denying specific relief, some courts require evidence that the delay was in bad faith and designed to
speculate on a rise in value. See, e.g., Hochard v. Deiter, 219 Kan. 738, 742, 549 P.2d 970, 975 (1976) (specific
performance granted, despite rise in value, because there was no evidence that the buyers delayed to speculate on
rise in value).
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difference between the market price on the date of breach and the contract
price, thereby depriving the buyer of the interim appreciation. 01
The date-of-breach formula for computing damages may also be used when
specific relief is denied because of some fault on the plaintiff's part other than
delay. In Hilton v. Nelsen,"'0 the court reversed a judgment ordering specific
performance of a contract to sell farm land on the ground (among others) of
overreaching by the buyer,103 but remanded the case for a determination of the
buyer's damages. 0 4 Without so holding, the court endorsed a formula for com-
puting damages as of the date of breach'0 5 that would deprive the buyer of any
appreciation in the value of the property'06 during the period of more than three
years between the date of breach (May 1, 1976) and the date of judgment
(June 15, 1979).107
A principle akin to mitigation of damages surfaces, with a somewhat simi-
lar effect in reducing the amount of damages awarded, in a number of cases in
101. Assume that the contract price is $100,000 and the property increases in value from $125,000 to
$145,000 from the date of breach and to the date of judgment. Damages computed as of the date of breach are
$25,000. Specific performance would enable the buyer to pocket a net gain of $45,000. See supra note 99. By
denying specific performance and computing damages as of the date of breach, the court reduces the buyer's net
gain by $20,000, the amount of the interim appreciation.
An alternative method of foiling attempts by buyers to hedge would be to compute damages as of the date of
judgment in all cases in which specific performance would normally be available as a remedy for breach. This
formula would strip the buyer of the option of recovering damages computed as of the date of breach if the
property declines in value. The effect of a date-of-judgment formula is to place the risk of any change in the value
of the property on the seller. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
Of course, a buyer may prefer to cover immediately rather than await specific performance or damages
computed as of the date of judgment. If the buyer has effected reasonable cover, it is arguable that damages
should be measured by the difference between the cover and contract price. Allowing the buyer to recover dam-
ages measured by the cover/contract price differential creates a risk, however, that a buyer who has covered may
have a hedge. If the property later increases in value, she will seek specific performance rather than the cover/
contract price differential; if the property declines in value, she will seek damages measured by the cover/contract
price differential. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
One commentator has suggested that the seller should be allowed to use cover by the buyer as a defense to
specific performance and that the buyer should be limited to damages measured by the cover/contract price
differential. See Waddams, supra note 94, at 453. Otherwise, the buyer may be doubly protected against a rise in
real estate values: she gets the benefit of appreciation on the substitute property and on the property in dispute (if
specific performance is granted or if damages are computed under a date-of-judgment formula). See id. A coun-
tervailing consideration in favor of granting specific performance is that it may be difficult to determine whether
the assets used to acquire the substitute property are traceable to assets freed up by the seller's breach. The
purchase of what appears to be a substitute may be an independent investment. See id.
102. 283 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1979).
103. For further analysis of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 25-35 and infra notes 158-60, 290-
300.
104. Hilton, 283 N.W.2d at 883-84.
105. See id. at 884 n.5.
106. The effect of the date-of-breach formula in depriving the buyer of interim appreciation may be illus-
trated mathematically by assuming that the contract price for the farm land was $180,000, the value on the date
of breach was $250,000, and the value on the date of judgment was $300,000. Had specific performance been
ordered, the purchaser would have obtained property worth $300,000 for $180,000, producing a net gain of
$120,000. Damages computed as of the date of breach in accordance with the formula endorsed by the court
would be $70,000, which is $50,000 less than the net gain to the buyer from performance. The difference is
attributable to the buyer's loss of the interim appreciation of $50,000.
107. Using the date-of-breach formula would have the opposite effect of increasing the buyer's recovery if the
property declined in value. See supra note 99. However, the existence of high inflation during the period at issue
in Hilton (the late 1970s) makes it almost certain that the date-of-breach formula would result in a lower recov-
ery than the date-of-judgment formula.
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which specific performance is denied on the basis of an express cost-benefit
analysis.' Typically, the plaintiff presents a prima facie claim to specific per-
formance by showing that breach of the contract would injure an interest of the
plaintiff in real property.109 The defendant answers by showing that the cost of
performance in accord with the terms of the agreement exceeds the benefit to
the plaintiff. Accepting this fact as defense to specific performance, a court may
simultaneously award damages measured by the harm suffered by the plaintiff
as a result of the breach."10 The combined effect of denying specific perform-
ance and computing damages by this formula is to absolve the defendant of
liability for the excess of the cost of performance over the amount of the plain-
tiff's own loss. Although this outcome is technically not an application of the
mitigation doctrine,""' the policy of minimizing losses that underlies the doc-
trine"' explains why courts measure damages by the harm to the plaintiff
rather than order the defendant to perform specifically or to pay the monetary
equivalent of performance as damages." 3
2. The Certainty Doctrine
The Second Restatement of Contracts provides that "[d]amages are not
recoverable for loss beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be estab-
lished with reasonable certainty.""" To understand the relationship between
this provision (known as the certainty doctrine) and equitable defenses, it is
necessary to bear in mind that a plaintiff seeking specific performance or an
injunction usually has to establish that damages would be a less adequate rem-
edy than equitable relief." 5 A significant factor in establishing relative inade-
108. See, e.g., Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Martin, 227 Ill. 260, 81 N.E. 417 (1907); Smith v. Meyers, 130
Md. 64, 99 A. 938 (1917). Cf E. Yoo, supra note 3, § 2.3 (availability of specific performance depends on
implicit cost-benefit analysis).
109. See E. Yoeio, supra note 3, § 10.2.1 (virtually all interests in real estate protected by equitable
remedies).
I10. See, e.g., Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Martin, 227 Ill. 260, 81 N.E. 417 (1907); Smith v. Meyers, 130
Md. 64, 99 A. 938 (1917). See also Webb v. Direct London & Portsmouth Ry., 1 DeG. M. & G. 522, 42 Eng.
Rep. 654 (1852) (railroad's promise to pay £4500 for land on which to build rail line not subject to specific
performance, but plaintiff entitled to damages in the amount of loss caused by nonperformance).
11 I. The principle in the text absolves the defendant of an obligation to perform (or to pay damages mea-
sured by the cost of performance) when the plaintiff's loss is less than the cost of performance. The mitigation
doctrine requires that damages be reduced by the amount of loss that the plaintiff could have avoided.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 80-83.
113. A similar issue arises in construction or repair eases in which the plaintiff seeks the cost of completion
or repair as damages, and the defendant argues that damages should be limited to the decline in market value.
See generally Yorio, supra note 3, at 1388-424. To give the plaintiff the benefit of the bargain, damages should be
measured by the cost of completion or repair in the normal case. See Id. at 1402-05. Particular facts may justify
limiting the plaintiff's recovery to the decline in value or to some other amount less than the cost of completion or
repair. See id. at 1408-24.
Cases that award less than the cost of completion or repair in response to particular facts document the
flexibility that underlies our system of contract remedies. See id. at 1405-24. Whether the choice is between the
equitable remedy of specific performance and the legal remedy of damages or between two different measures of
damages, courts ought to respond to the particular circumstances of the dispute in devising a remedy for the
breach. See infra text accompanying notes 215-23.
114. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 352 (1981).
115. See supra text accompanying note 10.
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quacy of damages is the difficulty of proving them with reasonable certainty.116
If this factor establishes a prima facie claim to specific performance or an in-
junction, but specific relief is ultimately denied on the ground of an equitable
defense, the plaintiff faces the prospect that damages may also be denied (or
limited) by virtue of the certainty doctrine."1 7
Consider, for example, the facts of McKinnon v. Benedict."'8 Benedict
agreed to a covenant restricting the ways in which he could develop real estate
that he acquired through an interest-free loan provided by McKinnon, a neigh-
boring landowner. McKinnon later sought to enjoin Benedict from developing
the property in violation of the covenant, arguing that development would de-
stroy the character of the neighborhood and spoil his view over Benedict's land.
In light of the difficulty of quantifying McKinnon's esthetic and subjective loss,
the case for issuing an injunction was particularly strong. 19
The court decided otherwise, relying on a set of circumstances that to-
gether were held to constitute a defense to injunctive relief: inadequacy of con-
sideration; hardship on Benedict if development of his property were enjoined;
and wide disparity in the business experience of the parties.1 20 Denied an in-
junction, McKinnon would haye to overcome the certainty doctrine in order to
recover damages for his esthetic loss. The court might have allowed the trier-of-
fact to set damages based on McKinnon's testimony that the value of his prop-
erty would decline by $50,000 if Benedict proceeded with development.121 But
McKinnon's own real estate expert was unable to testify as to the amount of the
depreciation,' 22 making it plausible that recovery for the loss would be pre-
cluded by the certainty doctrine."13 This outcome would be difficult to defend on
normative grounds if otherwise similarly-situated plaintiffs were able to obtain
monetary compensation for their losses simply because damages happen to be
easy to prove."24
To test the validity of this criticism, a brief review of the origin and current
status of the certainty doctrine is essential. The doctrine originated as a judicial
device to control the discretion of juries in awarding damages for breach of
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360(a) (1981).
117. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 298-99 (efficacy of legal claim depends on ability of plaintiff to prove
damages).
118. 38 Wis. 2d 607, 157 N.W.2d 665 (1968).
119. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
120. See McKinnon, 38 Wis. 2d at 616-22, 157 N.W.2d at 670-72.
121. See id. at 622 n.1, 157 N.W.2d at 672 n.l.
122. See id.
It is possible that the expert's inability to estimate the amount of the loss was part of a strategy on the part of
McKinnon to establish the propriety of injunctive relief, but McKinnon's own willingness to place a figure on the
decline in value seems inconsistent with such a strategy. See supra text accompanying note 121. In any event,
once an injunction was denied on the ground of an equitable defense, the prior testimony of the expert about his
inability to assess the amount of the depreciation would weaken McKinnon's attempt to recover damages.
123. Whether the certainty doctrine would be invoked to deny MeKinnon any recovery may also depend on
the weight given to the various reasons for denying an injunction. One of the reasons-hardship on Bene-
dict-would not be cause to deny damages. But two of the reasons-inadequacy of consideration and disparity in
the business experience of the parties-might lead the court to invoke the certainty doctrine to deny MeKinnon
any recovery. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 140-44 (reasons for denying equitable relief may not be grounds
for denying damages under the certainty doctrine).
124. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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contract. 12 5 To avoid harsh applications of the doctrine, courts developed a se-
ries of modifications that would allow the plaintiff to prove damages when the
facts warranted. 126 As a consequence, the certainty doctrine was less a rule
compelling judges to disallow damages than a principle that judges were free to
invoke whenever there was a risk that a jury might be overly generous in quan-
tifying the plaintiff's loss.'
27
Contemporary authorities confirm that application of the doctrine is discre-
tionary rather than mandatory. Section 1-106 of the Uniform Commercial Code
urges that remedies "be liberally administered" to the end of compensating the
aggrieved victim of a breach. 8 In the comments to the same section, the
draftsman explains why stringent application of the certainty doctrine would be
inconsistent with the compensation goal: "[One purpose of this section] is to
reject any doctrine that damages must be calculable with mathematical accu-
racy. Compensatory damages are often at best approximate: they have to be
proved with whatever definiteness and accuracy the facts permit, but no
more." 29 The Second Restatement of Contracts elaborates further on the dis-
cretion afforded courts in applying the doctrine:
Doubts are generally resolved against the party in breach. A party who has, by
his breach, forced the injured party to seek compensation in damages should not be
allowed to profit from his breach where it is established that a significant loss has
occurred. A court may take into account all the circumstances of the breach, including
willfulness, in deciding whether to require a lesser degree of certainty, giving greater
discretion to the trier of the facts. Damages need not be calculable with mathematical
accuracy and are often at best approximate. 30
In exercising its power to withhold a case from the trier-of-fact, a court, follow-
ing the Code or the Restatement, will base its decision on the entire circum-
stances of the dispute. If this process seems to produce sharply discontinuous
outcomes in any two cases, those outcomes may reflect a normative judgment by
the court, based on the facts, that one plaintiff, but not the other, deserves a
chance to prove damages to the satisfaction of the trier-of-fact.' 3 '
As an example of the willingness of courts to tolerate great uncertainty
when the facts warrant, Van Wagner Advertising Corp. v. S & M Enterprises" 2
merits detailed scrutiny. Van Wagner held a lease for ten years (including op-
tions) on space facing the Queens Midtown Tunnel, one of New York City's
major automobile arteries. Van Wagner erected an illuminated billboard at the
site, which it subleased for three years to another advertising company. S & M
purchased the building on which the billboard was located with the intention of
razing the property and redeveloping the entire block. When S & M terminated
the lease, Van Wagner sued for specific performance.
125. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 881; C. MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF DAMAGES 97-99 (1935).
126. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 125, at 101-04.
127. Id. at 101.
128. U.C.C. § 1-106.
129. Id. at comment 1.
130. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 comment a (1981).
131. Cf. Chafee II, supra note 24, at 1096 (judge in setting damages is unlikely to disregard factors that led
to denial of equitable relief).
132. 67 N.Y.2d 186, 492 N.E.2d 756, 501 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1986).
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The trial court denied specific performance on the grounds that Van Wag-
ner had an adequate remedy at law in damages and that the equitable remedy
would cause disproportionate harm to S & M. The court limited Van Wagner's
recovery of damages to the revenues lost on the sublease for the period through
trial, without prejudice to a new action by Van Wagner for subsequent damages
if S & M continued to refuse to allow it to occupy the space.
133
By awarding damages only up to the judgment date, the trial court implic-
itly accepted the position of both parties, made clear in their cross appeals, that
future damages were too speculative.23 4 Van Wagner, in support of specific per-
formance, argued that the advertising space at issue was unique and that dam-
ages extrapolated from the existing three-year sublease would not be adequate
compensation for its loss on the remainder of the lease." 5 S & M, in resisting
Van Wagner's alternative claim to damages, argued that assessing future rents
on the space was necessarily conjectural, particularly in light of two contingen-
cies in the lease giving the owner the right to terminate upon a sale of the
property or upon a reletting of the building to a tenant who needed the space
for its own purposes. 13
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to deny specific per-
formance, but reversed the decision to limit damages to the period through trial,
holding that Van Wagner was entitled to recover damages for the entire lease
period without having to bring a multiplicity of suits. 37 The Court of Appeals
thus rejected the position of both parties and the (implicit) holding of the trial
court that future damages were too uncertain. Although some of the arguments
made by the Court of Appeals in support of its holding are unpersuasive, 38 one
passage in the opinion offers a convincing rationale for not allowing S & M to
benefit from rigid application of the certainty doctrine:
S & M having successfully resisted specific performance on the ground that there is an
adequate remedy at law, cannot at the same time be heard to contend that damages
• . . must be denied because they are conjectural. . .. If any uncertainty is generated
by the two contingencies, the benefit of the doubt must go to Van Wagner and not the
contract violator. 139
The court's willingness to tolerate uncertainty in the assessment of dam-
ages can also be justified by considering why Van Wagner failed to obtain spe-
cific performance. The court itself offered two reasons for denying the equitable
133. Id. at 191, 492 N.E.2d at 758, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
134. Id. at 194, 492 N.E.2d at 760, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
135. Id. at 192, 194, 492 N.E.2d at 759-60, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32.
136. Id. at 194, 492 N.E.2d at 760, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 632-33.
137. Id. at 196, 492 N.E.2d at 762, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 634.
138. The court stated that projecting damages into the future was hardly novel in the law, particularly when
the value of the lease could be determined by comparisons with Van Wagner's other billboard leases. Id. at 194,
492 N.E.2d at 760-61, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 633. This argument ignores Van Wagner's telling point that the space at
issue was truly unique, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals itself were willing to concede. Id. at 192-94,
492 N.E.2d at 759-60, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 631-32. As to S & M's right to terminate the lease upon various contin-
gencies, the court noted that those contingencies might never occur, which is a weak response to S & M's argu-
ment that the chance of the lease being terminated for legitimate reasons made future damages necessarily conjec-
tural. Id. at 194-95, 492 N.E.2d at 760-61, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 632-33.
139. Id. at 194-95, 492 N.E.2d at 761, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
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remedy: adequacy of damages and disproportionate harm to S & M. 40 A sub-
sequent section of this Article offers another explanation for the result.141 What
all these rationales have in common is that none is a ground for denying Van
Wagner monetary compensation for the breach.14 2 By contrast with the facts in
McKinnon,'14  both parties were experienced businesses, there were no flaws in
the bargaining process, and the consideration was adequate. Van Wagner de-
served the opportunity to establish damages for the entire lease period not be-
cause they were actually provable with reasonable certainty, but because the
facts did not justify forcing it to bring a multiplicity of suits to vindicate its
legitimate claim to expectation damages for the breach.
Van Wagner demonstrates that a plaintiff may be allowed to establish dam-
ages for its entire claim when the facts of the dispute justify setting aside the
certainty doctrine. Courts also have the flexibility to allow the plaintiff to re-
cover part of its loss in appropriate circumstances. 4 4 If, for example, a breach
of contract has caused both objective and subjective loss, a court may instruct
the jury to ignore the subjective loss and limit its award to objectively provable
damages (such as a decline in market value). 45
Even without explicit instruction, the jury as trier-of-fact may reflect in its
assessment of damages the particular facts that induced the court to deny equi-
table relief. 41 In an interesting series of cases decided during the 1920s arising
out of feverish speculation in real estate, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
was asked to decide whether to order specific performance after a boom (or
bust) in real estate values."47 Although specific performance is generally the
rule in this context,"48 the court decided in the first two cases to deny that rem-
140. Id. at 194-95, 492 N.E.2d at 761, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 633. For criticism of the court's use of the adequacy
doctrine to justify denying specific performance, see E. Yopio, supra note 3, S 15.5, at 395; Laycock, supra note
2, at 751-52.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 174-78 (denying specific performance prevents the plaintiff from
using an equitable decree to negotiate an overcompensatory settlement).
142. If the rationale for denying specific performance is adequacy of damages, damages should be awarded
in the amount adequate to compensate for the plaintiff's loss. If the rationale is to avoid disproportionate harm to
the defendant from specific performance, an award of damages in the amount of the plaintiff's loss avoids the
envisioned harm. If the rationale is to prevent the plaintiff from using specific performance to obtain an overcom-
pensatory settlement, denying specific performance accomplishes that objective and there is no reason to deny the
plaintiff damages in a compensatory amount.
See also infra text accompanying notes 277-82 (reasons for denying specific performance may not weaken
plaintiff's claim to expectation damages).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
144. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 352 comment a (1981) (inability to prove the total amount
of a loss need not bar the plaintiff from any recovery, but merely excludes those damages not established with
reasonable certainty).
145. Cf. R. SHARPE, supra note 97, at 367-68 (resisting specific performance allows the defendant to retain
subjective value).
146. See Z CHAE, supra note 45, at 27 (jury may be as sensitive as judge to defendant's unconscionable
behavior); R. SHAIRPE, supra note 97, at 368 (juries influenced by same factors that led judge to deny specific
relief); Chafee I, supra note 38, at 894 (success in equity may give defendant a sympathetic jury).
147. See Welling v. Crosland, 129 S.C. 127, 123 S.E. 776 (1923); Sumner v. Bankhead, 119 S.C. 78, 111
S.E. 891 (1921); Schmid v. Whitten, 114 S.C. 245, 103 S.E. 553 (1919).
For an explanation of the reasons for the speculative fever, see Welling v. Crosland, 129 S.C. 127, 158-59,
123 S.E. 776, 787 (1923) (Fraser, J., dissenting).
148. See E. YoRto, supra note 3, §§ 10.2.1, 10.3.1.
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edy on the ground that the contracts were "speculative. 1 49 In the second of
these cases, the court limited the plaintiff's remedy to retention of a downpay-
ment that the agreement at issue fixed as liquidated damages in the event of
breach.150 The ultimate remedial outcome in the first case is less clear.'15 One
possibility was that the plaintiff would recover damages at law measured by the
difference between the market value of the land and the contract price. If so,
the defendant's success in resisting specific performance would turn out to be a
Pyrrhic victory.152
That the actual damages awarded were likely to be far less became clear in
a case decided four years later. Faced with the same issue, the court distin-
guished its prior holdings and ordered specific performance.153 A dissenting
judge, who had written one of the previous opinions denying specific perform-
ance'5 and had concurred in the other, 55 made clear what was really at stake:
if specific performance were denied, the plaintiff would have to face a jury as
the trier-of-fact, which would determine how much he had lost. 56 The dissenter
prefaced this reference to the jury with a description of the speculative craze
that gripped the South Carolina real estate market in 1920.157 What the dis-
senter almost certainly envisioned as the sequel to an equitable defense was an
assessment of damages by the jury that would reflect its own awareness of the
speculative fever that had led the court to deny specific performance in the prior
cases.
Similar considerations may explain why the Supreme Court of Minnesota
in Hilton v. Nelsen,'" after denying specific performance, insisted that both
parties be given the right on remand to elect a jury trial on the damages issue
even though both may have waived a jury trial in the court below. 159 It is hard
to imagine a Minnesota jury not being influenced in setting damages by these
facts: the defendant (Nelsen) was a native Minnesotan; the plaintiff (Hilton)
was a sophisticated, out-of-state, real estate investor; the contract was drafted
by Hilton and slanted in his favor; and Nelsen was not represented by a lawyer
at the execution of the contract and did not understand basic terms in the
agreement. 60
149. Sumner v. Bankhead, 119 S.C. 78, 81, 111 S.E. 891, 892 (1921); Schmid v. Whitten, 114 S.C. 245,
251, 103 S.E. 553, 554 (1919).
For an early case in which specific performance against a buyer was denied after a bust in a speculative real
estate market, see Savile v. Savile, I P. Wns. 745, 24 Eng. Rep. 596 (Chancery 1721).
150. Sumner v. Bankhead, 119 S.C. 78, 81, 111 S.E. 891, 892 (1921).
151. On the issue of damages, the court merely stated: "[Ilet the respondent sue on the law side for damages
if he has sustained any." Schmid v. Whitten, 114 S.C. 245, 252, 103 S.E. 553, 554 (1919).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
153. See Welling v. Crosland, 129 S.C. 127, 123 S.E. 776 (1923).
154. See Sumner v. Bankhead, 119 S.C. 78, 79, 111 S.E. 891 (1921) (Fraser, J.).
155. See Schmid v. Whitten, 114 S.C. 245, 252, 103 S.E. 553, 554 (1919) (Fraser, J., concurring).
156. Welling v. Crosland, 129 S.C. 127, 159, 123 S.E. 776, 787 (1923) (Fraser, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 158-59, 123 S.E. at 787 (Fraser, J., dissenting).
158. 283 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1979). For additional discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying
notes 25-35 & 102-07.
159. Hilton, 283 N.W.2d at 884 n.6.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
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C. Bargaining in the Shadow of Equitable Defenses'6 '
In an influential article, Calabresi and Melamed distinguish between
"property" and "liability" rules for protecting legal entitlements." 2 A right is
protected by a property rule if it can be appropriated by a nonowner only by
first purchasing permission from the holder of the right. If the nonowner does
not offer enough, the holder may veto a transfer of the right. Failure to
purchase a property right in advance may subject a taker to a special sanction
such as a fine or imprisonment. By contrast, if a legal right is protected by a
liability rule and is appropriated by a nonowner, the original holder of the right
is entitled only to compensation in money damages set by an agent of the
state.11
3
A contractual plaintiff's entitlement is protected by a property rule when
specific performance or an injunction is the normal remedy for breach of the
contract at issue.'64 Upon issuance of an equitable decree, the defendant must
either comply or purchase the plaintiff's right to performance in negotiations.
Failure to comply or to purchase a release may subject the defendant to penal-
ties for civil or criminal contempt. 65
The effect of a specific performance decree on the relative bargaining posi-
tion of the parties depends on whether the defendant may satisfy the decree by
arranging a substitute in the market. A defendant who is ordered to perform
routine construction work, for example, can comply with the decree by hiring a
surrogate to do the work. The effect of specific performance on bargaining be-
tween the parties is likely to be minimal because the defendant need only use
the amount that would have been assessed as damages to arrange a substitute
transaction. 61
Many cases in which specific performance is ordered, however, involve obli-
gations for which cover in the market is impossible.6 7 In these cases, the de-
A judge as trier-of-fact may also be influenced in assessing damages by the same facts that led to the denial
of equitable relief. See Chafe II, supra note 24, at 1096 (judge unlikely to disregard factors that led to denial of
equitable relief).
161. This phrase derives from the title of an article that appeared in 1979. See Mnookin & Kornhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ. 950 (1979); see also Cooter &
Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 225
(1982).
162. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARv. L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1972).
163. Id. at 1092, 1106-10.
164. See Yorio, supra note 3, at 1406-07.
165. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 820 (defendant who disobeys court order may be subject to
criminal contempt at the instance of the court and to civil contempt at the instance of the plaintiff); H. McCLIN-
TOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY § 17 (2d ed. 1948) (equitable decrees backed by fines or impris-
onment for contempt).
166. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 286-87 (if seller is able to cover in the market, order of specific perform-
ance is unlikely to increase the costs of settlement negotiations); Yorio, supra note 3, at 1399-401 (legal rule that
allows promisor to perform through a surrogate reduces the costs of negotiations between the parties to settle their
dispute).
167. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONRACTS § 360(b) (1981) (difficulty of obtaining a substitute is an
important factor in ordering specific relief); Laycock, supra note 2, at 691, 703 (modern test of inadequacy of
damages and of propriety of specific performance is whether the plaintiff can use damages to replace the specific
thing he has lost).
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fendant lacks the option of arranging a substitute transaction or the option
available under a liability rule of paying a sum of damages to satisfy her legal
obligation. 68 Faced with the prospect of a judicial order and possible contempt,
the defendant has reason to offer generous terms in settlement negotiations. 169
The plaintiff's bargaining advantage is reduced whenever there is a chance
that the court will be persuaded to deny specific performance or an injunction
on the ground of an equitable defense. Because an equitable defense converts
the protection afforded the plaintiff's entitlement from a property rule to a lia-
bility rule, the plaintiff may be forced to accept less favorable terms for settling
the dispute.
The effect of equitable defenses on negotiations between the parties may be
illustrated by a leading nineteenth century case, Edwards v. Allouez Mining
Co.170 Allouez built a mill on its property for use in copper mining. As a result
of its operations, large quantities of sand were carried down a stream and de-
posited on nearby land. Edwards purchased a tract of the affected land, hoping
to force Allouez to purchase the land at an inflated price in order to continue its
operations. When negotiations between the parties broke down, Edwards
brought suit for an injunction barring Allouez from depositing silt on his land.
The Michigan Supreme Court denied the injunction on the ground that a party
who invites injury by buying land affected by a nuisance has no claim to equita-
ble relief even though he may have redress in a court of law.17 '
These facts dramatize how an equitable defense may be used to block an
attempt by a plaintiff to use an injunction to extort an overcompensatory settle-
ment. If Edwards had succeeded in obtaining an injunction, compliance by Al-
louez might have been prohibitively expensive. Rather than incur that cost, Al-
louez would have reason to offer generous terms to induce Edwards to settle the
dispute. Edwards would have an incentive to hold out as long as possible to
extract an even more favorable settlement.' 7' By invoking an equitable defense,
168. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 162, at 1106-10.
169. Cf. Bracewell v. Appleby, [1975] Ch. 408, 416 (injunction would place plaintiffs in "an unassailable
bargaining position").
170. 38 Mich. 46 (1878).
171. Id. at 51-52.
A vigorous dissenting opinion objected that the majority's reasoning makes the outcome dependent on who
brings the lawsuit. Id. at 54 (Campbell, J., dissenting). The original owner, who did not invite the injury, presum-
ably would be entitled to an injunction.
One commentator has defended the holding in Edwards on the ground that the burden on Allouez from being
enjoined would probably be greater than the harm to the subservient lands from the silt deposits. See Chafee II,
supra note 24, at 1093. Under this rationale, not only Edwards, but the original owner as well, would be denied an
injunction and limited to damages measured by the decline in the value of the land caused by the nuisance.
Allouez in effect obtains a private right of eminent domain to deposit silt over nearby lands. Id.
The extension of the eminent domain power countenanced by this analysis may be criticized for tolerat-
ing-indeed encouraging-a partial taking of property at a price (market value) that the injured party might not
have accepted voluntarily. See R. EPSTEIN, TAxINGs 164-65 (1985) (need to control private use of eminent do-
main power leads to "clear preference for injunctive relief"). This suggests that the majority in Edwards may
have been correct in limiting its holding-and the equitable defense--to plaintiffs who, by purchasing land subject
to a nuisance, hope to use the legal system to perpetrate a form of extortion.
172. See R. EPSTEIN, supra note 171, at 230 ("holdout value of demand for injunctive relief is enormous").
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the court was able to prevent Edwards from using the legal system to perpetrate
legal extortion.1"a
Van Wagner Advertising Corp. v. S & M Enterprises'7 4 demonstrates that
courts remain unwilling to grant equitable relief if its effect would be to give the
plaintiff excessive leverage in the bargaining process. Van Wagner sought spe-
cific performance of a promise to lease space overlooking one of New York
City's major motor vehicle arteries. Conceding that the location was unique, the
Court of Appeals nevertheless denied specific performance. 17 5 Noting that the
equitable remedy might impede S & M's plans for razing the building and
redeveloping the property, the court concluded that the harm to S & M from
specific performance would exceed the benefit to Van Wagner. 78
The court's fear about inhibiting redevelopment may have been un-
founded-S & M probably would have been able to purchase Van Wagner's
right to performance in bargaining between the parties subsequent to a specific
performance decree.177 But Van Wagner would have an incentive to hold out as
long as possible in the negotiations and S & M would have reason to offer a
generous settlement to be rid of a troublesome obstacle to its redevelopment
plans. By denying specific performance, the court deprived Van Wagner of lev-
erage to obtain an overcompensatory settlement. 78
D. Summary
After denying specific performance or an injunction on the ground of an
equitable defense, a court is not forced to choose between rescinding the con-
tract in its entirety (and thus depriving the plaintiff of any relief) or awarding
the monetary equivalent of performance as damages. A court may limit the
plaintiff's recovery to restitution or reliance damages or may enforce a liqui-
dated damages provision agreed to by the parties. Application of the mitigation
or certainty doctrine may result in an award of damages that falls short of the
monetary value of performance. Discretion of the trier-of-fact in assessing dam-
ages may have the same effect. The existence of separate equitable defenses
may also influence negotiations between the parties by depriving the plaintiff of
leverage to obtain an overcompensatory settlement.
173. See Edwards, 38 Mich. at 52 (no reason why plaintiff "should have the assistance of an injunction to
aid his schemes").
174. 67 N.Y.2d 186, 492 N.E.2d 756, 501 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1986). For a more extensive discussion of this
case, see supra text accompanying notes 132-43.
175. Van Wagner, 67 N.Y.2d at 195-96, 492 N.E.2d at 761-62, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 633-34.
176. Id. at 195, 492 N.E.2d at 761, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
177. See Yorio, supra note 3, at 1398 (parties have ability to negotiate around specific performance decree).
178. The plaintiff in Van Wagner abandoned possession of the billboard space to the defendant under protest.
See Van Wagner, 67 N.Y.2d at 190, 492 N.E.2d at 758, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 630. This fact suggests that the plaintiff
might have sought to remove the defendant from possession by the legal remedy of ejectment. See Sun Oil Co. v.
Fleming, 469 F.2d 211, 214 (10th Cir. 1972) (ejectment rather than specific performance is the proper remedy for
recovery of property from which lessee was improperly evicted). As a legal remedy, ejectment is technically not
subject to equitable defenses. But the same factors that led the court to deny specific performance of the
lease-hardship on the defendant and the risk of an overcompensatory settlement-probably would have deterred
the court from ejecting the defendant and restoring the space to the plaintiff. Cf. infra text accompanying notes
232-34 (reasons for denying specific performance may also bar expectation damages).
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V. FLAWS IN THE CRITICISMS OF EQUITABLE DEFENSES
The preceding part has demonstrated that the premises of the critics of
equitable defenses are seriously flawed. After denying equitable relief, a court is
not limited in its remedial choices to either awarding its equivalent in damages
or denying any relief whatsoever. Still, some of the observations of the critics
are accurate. Differences between equitable and legal defenses are now less dra-
matic in practice than theory would suggest. As legal defenses have gradually
expanded, the number of cases in which damages may be granted after equita-
ble relief is denied has diminished. 1 79 That trend has almost certainly acceler-
ated with the merger of courts of law and equity into unified judicial systems.' 80
Despite these developments, it is premature to sound the death-knell for
separate equitable defenses. The Second Restatement of Contracts and other
modern authorities continue to endorse traditional doctrine by noting situations
in which the facts support an equitable defense, but not rescission of the con-
tract in its entirety.' 8' However reduced in number, there are cases decided in
the 1980s in which appellate courts endorse an award of damages in lieu of
specific performance when the facts warrant. 18 2 The legal system has been un-
willing thus far to discard a long tradition of separate defenses to equitable
relief. 8
3
Critics of equitable defenses also underestimate the practical effect of sepa-
rate equitable defenses on negotiations between the parties to a contractual dis-
pute. Current law imposes a risk on the plaintiff that specific relief may be
denied based on an equitable defense and a risk on the defendant that damages
may be awarded despite success in equity. If the legal system adopted unified
defenses to legal and equitable remedies, those risks would change and the out-
come of bargaining between the parties in certain cases might be considerably
different. 84
179. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364 comment a (1981) (gradual expansion of legal de-
fenses has narrowed the area of traditional distinction between equitable and legal relief).
180. Cf. Chafee I, supra note 38, at 895 (issue of defenses is the same in law and equity after merger).
181. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 364, illustrations 3-4 (1981); E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 23, at 837-38.
182. See, e.g., Peachtree on Peachtree Investors Ltd. v. Reed Drug Co., 251 Ga. 692, 308 S.E.2d 825 (1983)
(affirmance of trial court's decision that lessee's remedy should be limited to damages based on the fair market
value of the lease); Route 73 Bowling Center, Inc. v. Aristone, 192 N.J. Super. 80, 84, 469 A.2d 85, 87-88 (1983)
(remand to determine damages after denial of specific performance on ground of public policy); Van Wagner
Advertising Corp. v. S & M Enters., 67 N.Y.2d 186, 492 N.E.2d 756, 501 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1986) (lessee held
entitled to damages for entire lease period after denial of specific performance on ground of hardship to defend-
ant); Pecorella v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 1064, 1066, 486 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563-64 (4th Dept.
1985) (trial court may award damages after denial of specific performance on ground of equitable defense); Patel
v. Ali, [1984] 1 Ch. 283, 1 All E.R. 978 (defendant ordered to furnish security for damages after denial of specific
performance on grounds of hardship and changed circumstances).
183. The distinction between rescinding a contract in its entirety and simply denying specific performance
dates to at least the early nineteenth century. See Cadman v. Homer, 18 Ves. 10, 34 Eng. Rep. 221 (1810); see
also Day v. Newman, 2 Cox. Ch. 77 (1788) (specific performance denied because of disparity between contract
price and value of the subject property).
184. Abolishing separate equitable defenses may also affect the original negotiations between parties in set-
ting the terms of their agreement. For example, a party who foresees a risk of extortionate demands due to the
availability of specific performance and the abolition of equitable defenses, see supra text accompanying notes
177-78, may exact a greater price in contractual negotiations to protect against that risk. This suggests that the
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The charge that separate equitable defenses betray a double standard of
morality in the administration of justice185 distorts what is in fact a complex
array of possible remedial responses that vary with the facts of the particular
case, as the analysis in Part VI will demonstrate. 8 ' It is this responsiveness that
is the source of one of the criticisms leveled by legal economists against equita-
ble defenses. Because of the discretion involved in adjudicating equitable claims,
it is difficult to assess the probability (or consequences) of success in asserting
an equitable defense. As a result, costs to litigants and to the legal system are
higher than in a world without discretionary defenses. 1817 To assume, however,
that an increase in costs is inefficient ignores the trade-off in terms of the bene-
fit of having a more responsive legal system.1 88
There is reason also to doubt the claim that the existence of substance-
based equitable defenses leads to inefficiency in the form of higher prices. 89 For
equitable defenses to have an effect on prices, three conditions have to be met:
first, buyers must be aware of the doctrine that precludes specific performance,
but tolerates an award of damages; second, buyers must respond to the doctrine
by reducing their search for favorable deals; 90 and third, the failure of these
buyers to seek out better deals must result in higher prices. Neither the first nor
the second condition is likely to be satisfied. Few, if any, buyers are likely to be
aware of the doctrine of equitable defenses. Moreover, a rational buyer, even if
cognizant of the doctrine, still has a powerful incentive to comparison-shop be-
cause of the likelihood that the seller will perform despite the availability of an
equitable defense. Most contracts are not breached, primarily because of extra-
legal sanctions from failing to perform (such as injury to the seller's good-
will).' 9' Even if the seller breaches and specific performance is barred by an
equitable defense, the buyer has a claim to damages. All other things being
equal,' 9 the better the bargain negotiated by the buyer, the higher the amount
legal system need not be concerned with the consequences of abolishing separate equitable defenses because con-
tractual parties will simply reflect abolition in the terms of their agreement. See generally Coase, The Problem of
Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). However, the current system of providing for separate equitable de-
fenses may reflect what most contractual parties want. If so, abolishing separate equitable defenses will lead to an
efficiency loss in the form of higher transaction costs in negotiating contractual terms to deal with the abolition of
separate equitable defenses. See Yorio, supra note 3, at 1377-80 (legal rule that reflects contractual parties'
preferences minimizes transaction costs).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37, 45-46.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 208-82. Cf. Z. CHAFE, supra note 45, at 102 (difference between
law and equity due not to varying levels of morality, but to the nature of the remedies involved).
187. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 301 (separate equitable defenses generate "uncertainty costs").
188. Cf. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L REV. 451, 467-68
(1974) (examination of trade-offs in determining allocative efficiency); Yorio, supra note 3, at 1414-15, 1423-24
(legal system would suffer loss if courts did not respond to particular facts in awarding remedies).
For illustrations of the responsiveness made possible by the existence of separate equitable defenses, see infra
text accompanying notes 208-82.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53 (economic criticism of equitable defenses assumes that some
buyers, cognizant of the legal rule, respond by not seeking out good deals).
191. See Macaulay, Noncontractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 60-
65 (1963) (extralegal sanctions play greater role in planning by businessmen than legal remedies).
192. It is possible, of course, that a court's outrage at the terms of the agreement will bar the buyer from any
recovery. Under those circumstances, however, it is the court's expansive view of legal defenses rather than the
existence of separate equitable defenses that gives the buyer a disincentive to negotiating a favorable deal.
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of damages awarded is likely to be.1'9 Given these incentives to seek out the
best possible terms, it is unsafe to conclude, in the absence of empirical evi-
dence, that abolishing substantive equitable defenses would have the effect of
lowering prices.""
VI. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR EQUITABLE DEFENSES
Parts IV and V of this Article have exposed flaws in both the premises and
conclusions of the critics of separate equitable defenses. The weakness of the
case against these defenses is ample reason for the legal system to hesitate
before treating legal and equitable defenses identically, but a definitive judg-
ment on this issue requires an analysis of the affirmative arguments for retain-
ing separate defenses to equitable relief.
A. Restraint on State Power
Under American law, courts have the ability to punish violations of equita-
ble decrees with fines or imprisonment for contempt.195 Under the civil law,
courts rarely exercise comparable contempt power'99 despite the underlying pre-
mise of the civil law that the injured party is entitled to a judgment for per-
formance.197 Civil law systems rely on a great variety of indirect methods of
securing performance that are less coercive than the contempt power. 98 Be-
cause enforcement orders are rarely directed personally to the defendant, the
193. The point in the text is obvious if the buyer succeeds in recovering damages measured by the difference
between the market (or cover) price and the contract price. See U.C.C. §§ 2-71 1(1)(a), 2-712(1), 2-713(1) (buyer
entitled to recover damages measured by the difference between either the market or cover price and the contract
price). The lower the contract price (and the better the deal), the higher the amount of damages will be.
194. Cf. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1717, 1744-51 (1982)
(common-law contract rules have minimal allocative effect).
195. See FED. R. Civ. P. 70 (court may in the proper case adjudge party in contempt); E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 23, at 820 (defendant subject to criminal contempt at the instance of the court and to civil contempt at
the instance of the plaintiff for violating court order); H. McCtiNrocK, supra note 165, at § 17 (equitable decrees
enforced by fines or imprisonment for contempt).
196. See B. NICHOLAS. FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 215 (1982) (French law notable for absence of contempt
power); Dawson, supra note 24, at 516, 527-28 (French and German courts usually do not exercise contempt
power to force defendant to perform); Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, VII INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 16-15, 16-29 (1976) (to the same effect).
197. See B. NICHOLAS, supra note 196, at 210-11 (specific performance generally available under French
law for contracts to convey ownership of property); N. HORN, H. KOTz, & H. LESER, GERMAN PRIVATE AND
COMMERCIAL LAW 90 (T. Weir trans. 1982) (injured party entitled to performance under German law); Dawson,
supra note 24, at 524 (injured party entitled to performance of many contracts under French law); Treitel, supra
note 196, at 16-12, 16-18 (injured party entitled to performance under French and German law).
198. In the case of a promise to convey moveable goods, a civil law court may simply have the goods seized
and transferred to the plaintiff. See B. NICHOLAS, supra note 196, at 211 (French law); Dawson, supra note 24, at
527 (German law); Treitel, supra note 196, at 16-15, 16-29 (French and German law). In the case of real estate,
a court may eject the defendant and put the plaintiff in possession or may transfer title to the plaintiff by a self-
executing judgment. See B. NICHOLAS, supra note 196, at 211 (French law); Dawson, supra note 24, at 527
(German law); Treitel, supra note 196, at 16-15, 16-29 (German and French law). In the case of a delegable
duty, a court may issue an order permitting the plaintiff to engage a surrogate to carry out the duty in place of the
defendant. See B. NICHOLAS, supra note 196, at 211-12 (French law); Dawson, supra note 24, at 527 (German
law); Treitel, supra note 196, at 16-15, 16-20 (French and German law). The defendant is usually liable for the
cost of a surrogate, which the court may require to be paid in advance. See Treitel, supra note 196, at 16-15.
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civil law plaintiff usually obtains performance without placing the defendant at
risk of imprisonment for contempt.199
The contrast between the exercise of the contempt power in common and
civil law systems led the eminent scholar John Dawson to attribute the excep-
tional nature of equitable relief in American law to the weight of public force
brought to bear against a recalcitrant promisor.200 Dawson argued that equita-
ble discretion has the practical effect of limiting the area in which coercion is
employed by American courts,20 1 but plays a much smaller role in civil law
systems because the defendant is rarely in jeopardy of imprisonment for
contempt. 202
Dawson's insight explains why a system that places the defendant at risk of
imprisonment would temper the exercise of coercion by adopting liberal de-
fenses to equitable relief 203 But Dawson himself stressed that this rationale for
equitable defenses would become less cogent if American law moved from the
contempt power to indirect methods of specifically enforcing contracts.2 0 4 To a
considerable extent, this change has already occurred.2 0 5 If, for example, a de-
fendant refuses to convey property pursuant to a specific performance decree, a
court may appoint someone to execute the deed, may issue a writ of attachment
or sequestration against the property of the defendant, or may divest the de-
fendant of title and vest title in the plaintiff of property within the court's juris-
diction. 0 If a decree directs the defendant to perform a specific act and she
refuses, a court may direct the act to be done by some other person at the cost
of the disobedient party.2 0 7 The replacement in these situations of the contempt
power by indirect methods of specifically enforcing contracts has weakened the
case for equitable defenses as a restraint on the exercise of state power. Equita-
ble defenses now need an independent justification for their continued existence.
199. Although use of the contempt power to enforce contractual promises is unusual in civil law countries,
there are certain promises that may give rise to a judicial order backed by contempt. See, e.g., Treitel, supra note
196, at 16-15 (German court may issue order to defendant to perform nondelegable duty); see also, Dawson,
supra note 24, at 527-28 (to same effect).
200. Dawson, supra note 24, at 535-38.
201. Id. at 536.
202. See id. at 530 (German judges do not have the discretionary power to refuse specific performance as a
way of obviating hardship or discouraging sharp bargaining).
203. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 823 ("severity of the sanctions available" for contempt may be a
rational explanation of the rarity of equitable relief in American law).
204. See Dawson, supra note 24, at 538 (shift from coercion to substituted performance would reduce barri-
ers to specific performance). Cf. Storke, Decrees in Rem under the New Rules, 13 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 140, 145
(1940) ("enforcement of any legal right by imprisonment. . . is a high-handed proceeding which can hardly be
justified if there is any other practicable means of attaining the same end").
205. See R. MILLAR. CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HIsToRICAL PERSPECTIVE 478-80 (1952)
(discussion of indirect methods of enforcing decrees under state and federal law); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER.
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3022 (1973) (list of four indirect methods of enforcing federal court
judgment to perform a specific act).
206. See FED. R. Cv. P. 70; Buzzell v. Edward H. Everett Co., 180 F. Supp. 893, 902-03 (D. Vt. 1960); C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 205, § 3022.
207. See FED. R. Civ. P. 70; C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 205, § 3022.
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B. Remedial Flexibility
Remedies for breach of contract in American law generally may be viewed
as lying on a continuum from specific performance to rescission of the con-
tract.208 To the plaintiff, specific performance affords the purest protection of
the expectancy interest; rescission leaves the plaintiff without a remedy for the
breach. 0 9 To the defendant, specific performance is usually the most unfavora-
ble outcome 210 (even without the risk of imprisonment for contempt); rescission
usually affords the defendant complete exoneration.211
Between these extremes lie legal remedies that give the plaintiff some relief
for the breach without requiring the defendant to perform. At the end of the
remedial continuum closest to rescission is restitution, a remedy that allows the
nonbreaching party to recover only the value of any benefit conferred on the
party in breach.212 Moving along the continuum toward specific performance,
208. The description of the remedial continuum in the text assumes that the contract is wholly or substan-
tially executory on the part of the plaintiff. After substantial part performance by the plaintiff and a repudiation
or material breach by the defendant, the plaintiff may sue in restitution for the reasonable value of her perform-
ance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 373(1) (1981); id. at § 373 comment a. In the case of what
would be a losing contract from the plaintiff's perspective, the amount recovered in restitution may exceed both
expectation damages and the benefits of specific performance by the defendant. Id. § 373 comment d. Although
some courts limit the plaintiff's recovery in restitution to the contract price, other courts allow the plaintiff to
recover reasonable value even if it exceeds the contract price. Compare Wuehter v. Fitzgerald, 83 Or. 672, 163 P.
819 (1917) (recovery in restitution limited to contract price) with Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570 (Cal. App. 1933)
(recovery in restitution in excess of contract price).
When, as in Boomer, the plaintiff recovers more than the contract price, the outcome falls outside the reme-
dial continuum described in the text. Cases like Boomer are relatively rare, however, because a defendant usually
has no reason to breach when the plaintiff has a losing contract. Moreover, the possibility of a restitutionary
recovery in excess of the contract price seems never to arise in the context of equitable defenses because the
plaintiff is seeking specific performance or an injunction, not restitution, for the defendant's breach.
209. Technically, rescission makes the contract unenforceable and is therefore not a remedy for breach of
contract. However, if the contract is rescinded, the plaintiff may be able to obtain restitution for any benefit
conferred on the defendant in performance of the contract. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 253-56, 662,
670 (plaintiff entitled to rescission and restitution in case of misrepresentation or mistake). Restitution does not
afford the plaintiff a remedy for breach of promise; it merely returns the defendant to the precontractual position.
Id. at 905 ("the effort [in restitution] is not to enforce the promise.., but to prevent unjust enrichment of the
party in breach"). In rare cases involving substantial part performance by the plaintiff, the remedy in restitution
may exceed expectation damages. See supra note 208.
210. Specific performance is unfavorable because it deprives the defendant of the option of paying damages
in satisfaction of her contractual obligation. See supra text accompanying notes 167-69. Specific performance may
also deprive the defendant of subjective value that she places on the property or of interim appreciation in the
market value of the property. See supra text accompanying notes 97-107, 145.
There are some cases in which specific performance may be preferable to damages from the defendant's
perspective. For breach of a construction contract, for example, damages measured by the cost of completion
presumably include a profit margin. The breaching contractor may prefer to perform herself to earn that profit.
Under these conditions, however, the contractor seems more likely in litigation to deny the existence of a contract
or of a breach or to raise a legal defense than to resist specific performance based on an equitable defense.
211. If the contract is rescinded, the defendant may be required to restore any benefit conferred by the
plaintiff in performance of the contract. See supra note 208.
212. See supra text accompanying note 72. Although the remedy in restitution may exceed expectation dam-
ages in rare circumstances, this is almost never the case when the issue of an equitable defense arises. See supra
note 208.
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restitution is usually followed by reliance damages,21 3 then liquidated dam-
ages, 21 4 and finally various measures of expectation damages.
The existence of this remedial continuum is the foundation of the most
important asset of separate defenses to equitable relief: the ability afforded
courts to shape the remedy to fit the facts of the particular case. As an illustra-
tion of this point, consider the following hypothetical. A buyer brings suit for
breach of a contract for which specific performance would be the normal rem-
edy. The seller answers by admitting nonperformance, but alleging facts in de-
fense of the breach. Under current law, a court may hold that these facts are
sufficient to constitute a defense to specific performance, but not to entitle the
seller to rescission of the contract. The buyer may then be awarded a remedy
for the breach that lies somewhere on the remedial continuum between specific
performance and rescission.
Suppose, however, that the legal system were to abolish separate equitable
defenses and treat defenses to equitable and legal relief identically. A court
faced with the same facts would have only two choices: either to reject the
defense and grant the buyer's request for specific performance or to accept the
defense and deny the buyer both equitable and legal relief. Abolishing separate
equitable defenses thus would have the practical effect of moving the outcome
of contractual disputes toward the extremes of the remedial continuum. Legal
doctrine would be clearer and simpler, but with a loss of sensitivity and respon-
siveness to circumstances that call for an outcome other than specific perform-
ance or rescission.
Separate equitable defenses enable courts to match the remedy awarded to
the circumstances of the dispute. The choice faced by a court in a particular
case may be between specific performance and full benefit-of-the-bargain dam-
ages.215 More often, the choice will be between a complete remedy (specific
performance or expectation damages) and a partial remedy (reliance damages
or restitution) .216 Circumstances that dissuade a court from granting specific
performance will often lead the court to deny benefit-of-the-bargain damages as
well.21 7 The judge's task is to determine whether the facts justify the remedy
sought by the plaintiff.
Viewing contract remedies again in terms of a continuum helps to clarify
the factors that should influence the court's decision. At the risk of some over-
simplification, the point on the continuum at which the remedy awarded will lie
generally depends on the reasons for denying specific performance or an injunc-
213. Reliance damages and restitution are equal when the only action taken by the plaintiff in reliance on the
contract is conferring a benefit on the defendant. Otherwise, reliance damages generally exceed restitution. See E.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 814 (restitution is ordinarily less than reliance damages because it does not
include expenditures in reliance that conferred no benefit on the defendant).
214. The position of liquidated damages on the continuum will vary with the facts. The amount stipulated as
damages may be lower than reliance damages, placing it closer to rescission on the continuum; or the amount
stipulated may be higher than expectation damages, placing it closer to-or even beyond-specific performance on
the continuum. However, if the amount is so high that it is determined to be a "penalty," a court may refuse to
enforce the clause. Id. at 895.
215. See infra text accompanying notes 275-82.
216. See infra text accompanying notes 285-86.
217. See infra text accompanying notes 228-34, 239-51.
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tion. The remedy is most likely to approach rescission on the continuum when
the agreement in dispute was defective at its inception because of misconduct
by the plaintiff in the bargaining process,2 s mistake as to a material fact,21 9 or
terms slanted unfairly in favor of the plaintiff.220 The remedy for breach is most
likely to approach specific performance on the continuum when the equitable
remedy is denied because of events subsequent to the formation of the contract,
such as delay by the plaintiff resulting in prejudice to the defendant;22l changed
circumstances making specific performance hard on the defendant; 22 or injury
to the public or third parties. 223
What follows is an analysis of a series of cases in which the remedy
awarded moves along the remedial continuum from restitution to full benefit-of-
the-bargain damages. The facts of each case are presented in considerable de-
tail in order to show how courts may use the flexibility afforded by equitable
defenses to adopt a remedy that is appropriate in light of all the circumstances
of the dispute.
In Hodge v. Shea,224 Hodge, a physician, requested specific performance of
a contract to convey twenty acres of land. As consideration for the land, Shea
was to receive a new Cadillac Coupe DeVille (approximate cost $5400) and
$4000 in cash; in addition to the land, Hodge was to receive Shea's used Cadil-
lac. Shea had been Hodge's patient for a number of years. At the time of con-
tract, Shea was seventy-five years old, an inebriate of long standing, and af-
flicted by serious chronic illnesses that rendered him infirm of body and mind.
The contract was signed during a period when Hodge was treating Shea on a
daily basis for various maladies. Two days later, Shea was admitted to a hospi-
tal for treatment.
On the day after Shea's discharge from the hospital, the parties partially
executed the agreement by exchanging Cadillacs. Hodge later resold the used
218. See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Andres, 97 F. Supp. 454 (N.D. Idaho 1951) (misrepresentation by plaintiff's
counsel); Perlmutter v. Bacas, 219 Md. 406, 149 A.2d 23 (1959) (innocent misrepresentation); Eisenbeis v. Shil-
lington, 349 Mo. 108, 159 S.W.2d 641 (1942) (innocent misrepresentation); Hodge v. Shea, 252 S.C. 601, 168
S.E.2d 82 (1969) (abuse of confidential relationship).
219. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Fawley, 112 Kan. 124, 210 P. 482 (1922) (plaintiff entitled to reliance damages
measured by brokerage commission after denial of specific performance because of defendant's mistake); King v.
Oxford, 282 S.C. 307, 318 S.E.2d 125 (Ct. App. 1984) (plaintiff allowed to recover reliance damages after denial
of specific performance on ground of mistake).
220. See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83-84 (3d Cir. 1948) (plaintiff denied both specific
performance and expectation damages where contract was unreasonably slanted in its favor).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 97-101 (plaintiff may recover expectation damages measured at the
date of breach after the denial of specific performance on the ground of delay).
222. See, e.g., Van Wagner Advertising Corp. v. S & M Enters., 67 N.Y.2d 186, 492 N.E.2d 756, 501
N.Y.S.2d 628 (1986) (hardship on the defendant ground for denying specific performance, but plaintiff may
obtain expectation damages for the breach); Patel v. Ali, [1984] 1 Ch. 283, 1 All E.R. 978 (hardship on defend-
ant ground for denying specific performance, but defendant ordered to furnish security for the plaintiff's
damages).
223. See, e.g., Peachtree on Peachtree Investors Ltd. v. Reed Drug Co., 251 Ga. 692, 308 S.E.2d 825 (1983)
(lessee entitled to expectation damages based on fair market value of lease after denial of specific performance
because of public interest in urban renewal); Route 73 Bowling Center, Inc. v. Aristone, 192 N.J. Super. 80, 469
A.2d 85 (1983) (purchaser of liquor license entitled to expectation damages measured by the market price/con-
tract price differential after denial of specific performance because of public interest in government control of
liquor licenses).
224. 252 S.C. 601, 168 S.E.2d 82 (1969).
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Cadillac for a gain (after repairs) of $2200.111 Thus, the net cost to Hodge of
the land was approximately $7200 (or $360 per acre).22 Three years earlier,
Shea had received an offer of $1000 per acre, which he rejected upon the advice
of his son-in-law, whom Shea did not consult before signing the agreement with
Hodge. The market value of the land on the contract date was fixed by a master
at $1200 per acre.227
The Supreme Court of South Carolina rejected Hodge's request for specific
performance on the grounds that the consideration was grossly inadequate, that
Hodge had abused the confidential relationship of physician and patient, that
the bargaining position of the parties was unequal because of Shea's mental and
physical infirmities, and that Hodge had used Shea's fatuous fondness for new
Cadillacs to entice him into an unfair trade.2 8 One judge dissented, arguing
that Shea's receipt and use of the new Cadillac without offering to reconvey it
was reason to grant Hodge's request for specific performance.22 19
The dissent's objection provides a basis for a claim in restitution for the
excess of the value of the new Cadillac received by Shea over the used Cadillac
obtained by Hodge in return. Shea in his answer offered to make an adjustment
for the excess, and the majority indicated that Hodge might apply and obtain
relief in that amount. 230 The majority was willing to grant restitution based on
Shea's retention of the Cadillac, but not specific performance because of
Hodge's own misconduct during the bargaining process. 231
In light of its litany of reasons for denying specific performance, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that the majority would have granted any further relief. Shea's
sale of the land for $1500 per acre (subject to clearing the cloud on title caused
by the contract with Hodge)2 32 furnished a standard for computing expectation
damages,23  but there is no indication in the opinion that the court would have
been at all receptive to a claim by Hodge to expectation damages. Nor was
Hodge likely to succeed in recovering damages incurred in reliance on a con-
tract procured by tactics regarded by the court as disreputable.234
225. Id. at 611, 168 S.E.2d at 86.
226. Hodge transferred a new Cadillac costing $5400 and was to transfer $4000 in cash for the land. De-
ducting the $2200 obtained on resale of Shea's used Cadillac, Hodge's net cost for the land was $7200. Dividing
this figure by twenty acres produces a net cost of $360 per acre.
227. Hodge, 252 S.C. at 605-06, 168 S.E.2d at 83.
228. Id. at 607-12, 168 S.E.2d at 84-87.
229. Id. at 613-14, 168 S.E.2d at 88 (Littlejohn, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 612, 168 S.E.2d at 87.
231. For an early case in which the court granted restitution after denying specific performance on grounds
of inadequacy of consideration and inequality in the bargaining capacity of the parties, see Wollums v. Horsley,
93 Ky. 582, 20 S.W. 781 (1892).
232. See Hodge, 252 S.C. at 606, 168 S.E.2d at 84.
233. Assuming that $1500 per acre was the market value of the land, Hedge would have received land worth
$30,000 ($1500 per acre times twenty acres) if Shea had performed in accordance with the contract. Deducting
the remaining unpaid contract price of $4000, expectation damages would be $26,000.
234. For an early case in which the court expressly refused to award the plaintiff anything above restitution,
see Margraf v. Muir, 57 N.Y. 155 (1874). The plaintiff contracted to purchase a parcel of real estate for $800
from a widow with six children. The plaintiff lived near the land, and was aware that its value had recently
increased to $2000. The defendant lived at a distance, and was unaware of the recent appreciation. When the
defendant refused to convey the property, the plaintiff sought specific performance or expectation damages mea-
sured by the difference between the value of the land and the contract price. The trial court held for the plaintiff,
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In contrast with Hodge v. Shea, a later case decided in the same jurisdic-
tion, King v. Oxford,235 presented facts that justified moving along the remedial
continuum toward specific performance by awarding reliance damages in lieu of
the equitable remedy. James King sought specific performance of a contract for
the sale of a corporation owned by Mary Oxford. Under the agreement, King
was to pay the difference between the fair market value of the assets and liabili-
ties of the corporation on the date of sale, an amount the court labeled the "net
asset value" of the corporation.2 31 Oxford transferred possession of the business
to King on October 31, 1979, but the parties did not execute a contract until
November 29, 1979. The parties were subsequently unable to agree on the net
asset value of the corporation, with Oxford demanding substantial compensation
for her shares and King claiming that he owed nothing because the net asset
value was negative. Upon Oxford's refusal to transfer the shares, King brought
suit for specific performance. Oxford sought to have the contract rescinded on
the grounds of fraud and mistake. The trial court decreed specific
performance. 37
In affirming the trial court's refusal to rescind the contract, the South Car-
olina Court of Appeals relied on the following facts. No confidential or fiduciary
relationship existed between the parties. Oxford had a college education and
had run the business for six years. She negotiated the terms of the agreement
herself and retained a lawyer to draft the contract before signing it.238 Any
mistake as to the net asset value of the corporation was due to information
supplied by Oxford, not to deceit on the part of King.
Although the court refused to rescind the contract, it reversed the trial
court's decision to grant specific performance on the ground that the terms of
the contract demonstrated that the parties had proceeded on the assumption
that the corporation had a substantial, positive net asset value.239 If the net
asset value was negative, as King contended, the parties made a mistake of
sufficient magnitude to justify a denial of specific performance. 24 0 The court
remanded the case for a determination of the net asset value of the corporation.
If it was determined to be nominal or negative, King would be denied specific
performance on the ground of mistake.2 41
The court also held that if specific performance was denied, King could
pursue a damages remedy for Oxford's refusal to tender the shares.242 The court
endorsed the benefit-of-the-bargain principle underlying expectation dam-
awarding $1200 in damages. Id. at 156. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred
in awarding expectation damages and that the plaintiff was entitled only to restitution of the purchase money
paid. Id. at 159-61.
235. 282 S.C. 307, 318 S.E.2d 125 (Ct. App. 1984).
236. Id. at 310, 318 S.E.2d at 127.
237. See id. at 310, 318 S.E.2d at 127.
238. Id. at 311-12, 318 S.E.2d at 127-28.
239. Id. at 315, 318 S.E.2d at 129-30.
240. Id. at 315, 318 S.E.2d at 130.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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ages, 243 but stated that if the corporation was worthless on the date of sale,
King would not suffer any expectancy damages .2 4 The court seemed to assume
that a nominal or negative net asset value meant that the corporation was
worthless. But the fact that the case was strenuously litigated indicates that the
corporation in fact had value presumably based on its future earning power. If
so, King may have suffered expectation damages computed under a formula
such as the difference between the market value of the shares and the contract
price. 45
In light of the parties' apparent mutual mistake, however, the court almost
certainly would have refused to allow King to recover expectation damages246
because that result would undo most of what the denial of specific performance
accomplished. 247 King was entitled nevertheless to some relief for Oxford's
breach, as the court made clear in endorsing an award of any natural, direct,
and proximate damages incurred in reliance on the contract.2 48 By contrast with
the plaintiff in Hodge v. Shea,24 9 King had a legitimate claim to reliance dam-
ages because the contract on which he relied was not the product of any miscon-
duct on his part, nor of any mental or physical infirmity on the part of Oxford.
Because she was more responsible than King for the parties' apparent mistake
as to the net asset value of the corporation,2 50 the court required her to bear any
loss suffered by King in reliance on the contract. 5 1
A court may move beyond restitution and reliance damages on the reme-
dial continuum by enforcing a liquidated damages provision agreed to by the
parties. In Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 2 15 2 the court refused to grant specific
performance of a contract for the sale of carrots because certain terms were
slanted unfairly in favor of Campbell, in particular a clause excusing Campbell
from accepting the carrots under certain circumstances, but preventing the
grower from reselling the carrots to third parties unless Campbell agreed.2 53
Although the court denied specific performance, 254 it insisted that the contract
243. Id. ("[t]he measure of damages. . . is the amount necessary to put King in the same position as if the
contract had been fulfilled"). See supra text accompanying note 32.
244. See King, 282 S.C. at 316, 318 S.E.2d at 130.
245. See E. Yomo, supra note 3, § 12.2.1.1, at 310-11 (damages for breach by seller may be measured by
the difference between the market and contract price of corporate shares).
Of course, assessing the market value of shares in a close corporation may be difficult, making specific per-
formance a common remedy in a case not affected by an equitable defense. See Id. § 12.2.1.2, at 314 (absence of
market in shares makes it difficult to assess damages and may justify specific performance).
246. See . FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 653-63 (mutual mistake as to a material fact may entitle
nonperforming party to avoid contract).
247. Instead of the shares, King would obtain their monetary equivalent as damages because the contract
price determined under the formula in the contract was apparently zero. See supra text accompanying notes 232-
34 (reasons for denying specific performance may also bar expectation damages).
248. See King, 282 S.C. at 316, 318 S.E.2d at 130. King had substantially changed his position by making
business arrangements with third parties on behalf of the corporation. See id. at 313-14, 318 S.E.2d at 129.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 224-33.
250. See King, 282 S.C. at 312, 318 S.E.2d at 128.
251. See also Nicholson v. Fawley, 112 Kan. 124, 210 P. 482 (1922) (plaintiff entitled to reliance damages
after denial of specific performance on ground of defendant's unilateral mistake).
252. 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
253. Id. at 83.
254. Technically, Campbell's requested relief was not specific performance, but injunctions preventing the
grower from selling the carrots to anyone but Campbell and ordering the grower to deliver the carrots to Camp-
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was not illegal and that the grower had no excuse for his deliberate breach.255
One clause in the contract provided for liquidated damages of $50 per acre for
any breach by the grower.2 56 The court's insistence on the validity of the con-
tract probably meant that Campbell would have succeeded in enforcing the liq-
uidated damages provision had it sought damages in the stipulated amount. 2517
The clause giving Campbell the right to veto third-party sales, though a bar to
specific performance, need not have undermined the provision for liquidated
damages.2
58
In Sumner v. Bankhead,25 9 Sumner contracted to resell real estate not yet
in his possession to Bankhead. At the time of contract, Bankhead made a down-
payment of ten percent on the purchase price, which the contract stipulated as
damages in the event of Bankhead's failure to perform. The agreement was
signed during a period of feverish speculation in real estate,2 80 with both parties
speculating on a continued rise in land values. 261 When the market in real estate
bell. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 75 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa. 1948). The effect of a mandatory injunction
ordering the grower to deliver the carrots to Campbell would be the same as specific performance. See E. Yoiuo,
supra note 3, § 1.2.2, at 9.
255. Campbell, 172 F.2d at 83.
256. Id. A liquidated damages clause normally does not prevent the injured party from obtaining specific
performance if the requirements for the equitable remedy are otherwise met and the clause was not intended to
give the breaching party a choice of paying the stipulated amount in lieu of performance. See F Yoiuo, supra
note 3, § 20.4, at 460; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 361 (1981). There is no indication that the
parties meant the clause to give the grower an alternative to performance. But the imbalance of certain terms in
the contract prevented Campbell from satisfying the requirements for equitable relief.
257. Campbell sought equitable relief in the form of negative and mandatory injunctions. Campbell, 75 F.
Supp. at 952. There is no indication in the district court opinion that Campbell asked the court to award liqui-
dated damages as alternative relief if the equitable remedies were denied. See id.
The presence of a liquidated damages provision normally precludes the injured party from recovering a
higher amount of damages. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 23, at 896 (proscription against penalty clauses
generally does not prevent enforcement of a damages clause on the low side). Perhaps Campbell did not request
liquidated damages because the amount stipulated was far less than the value of the bargain to Campbell. The
contract covered fifteen acres of farm land. Campbell, 172 F.2d at 81. Under the provision for liquidated damages
of $50 per acre, Campbell's recovery would be $750. The contract entitled Campbell to 100 tons of carrots at $30
per ton. Id. at 81. The parties stipulated that the market price of the carrots was $90 per ton. Id. at 81 n.l. By
being deprived of the carrots, Campbell suffered damages of $60 per ton, a total of $6000.
It is also possible that Campbell was concerned that a request for liquidated damages in the amount of the
stipulated sum might be an additional reason for the district court to conclude, as it did, that money damages
were adequate. Cf. E. YoRIo, supra note 3, § 20.4, at 461-64 (difficulty in interpreting liquidated damages provi-
sion may lead court to conclude that the provision was meant to give the breaching party an alternative to
performance).
258. By noting the absence in the contract of a damages provision in the grower's favor, see Campbell, 172
F.2d at 83, the court raised what appears to be an independent objection to enforcing the liquidated damages
provision in Campbell's favor. Had the issue been presented, however, it is unlikely that the court would have
refused to enforce the damages clause simply because the contract gave the grower no comparable remedy. In the
event of a breach by Campbell, the grower's damages could easily be determined by the difference between the
contract price and the market (or resale) price of the carrots. See U.C.C. §§ 2-706(l), 2-708(1). By contrast, the
court's finding that specific performance would normally be the proper remedy for the grower's breach implies
that Campbell's damages would be difficult to determine. See Campbell, 172 F.2d at 82-83. In light of the ease of
assessing the grower's damages and the difficulty of assessing Campbell's damages, it is not surprising that the
latter, but not the former, would be protected by a liquidated damages provision. Cf E. FARNSWORTH, supra note
23, at 896 (liquidated damages provision "may afford . . . compensation for loss that is not susceptible of proof
with sufficient certainty").
259. 119 S.C. 78, 111 S.E. 891 (1921).
260. See id. at 84, 111 S.E. at 893 (Cothran, J., dissenting).
261. See Id. at 83, 111 S.E. at 893 (Cothran, J., dissenting).
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collapsed, Bankhead refused to pay the remainder of the contract price and
Sumner brought suit for specific performance.
The court denied the equitable remedy on the ground that the contract was
"speculative. 1282 Two years earlier, the same court had refused, for the identical
reason, to grant specific performance of a real estate contract against a breach-
ing seller.283 In both cases, the court appeared to be concerned that an order of
specific performance might be interpreted as judicial approval of the real estate
craze: the effect of specific performance would be to secure for the plaintiff the
benefit of the boom (or bust) in land values.2" In Sumner, the court opted
instead to enforce the liquidated damages provision, thereby limiting the plain-
tiff to ten percent of the purchase price as damages.
2 15
In the proper circumstances, a court may allow a seller to retain an install-
ment payment even in the absence of a liquidated damages provision to that
effect. In Kleinberg v. Ratett,268 Kleinberg made a downpayment of $2000 pur-
suant to an agreement with Ratett to purchase a parcel of real estate. The con-
tract warranted that Ratett's title was free of all incumbrances. When Klein-
berg learned that a 24-inch pipe under the land encompassed a natural brook,
he brought suit to rescind the contract and recover the downpayment. Ratett
counterclaimed for specific performance.
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that neither the pipe, nor the brook,
constituted an incumbrance on title to the property.28 7 By tendering a deed,
Ratett offered full performance of his contractual obligations.28 Because no
fraud or deceit on the part of Ratett was shown, the court held that Kleinberg
was not entitled to rescission of the contract or to restitution of the downpay-
ment.2'9 The court also denied Ratett's request for specific performance because
at the time of contract Ratett was aware-and Kleinberg was ignorant-of the
existence of the pipe and brook and because great hardship would result from
specifically enforcing the contract. 70 The equipoise of these facts justifies the
court's refusal to intervene on behalf of either party, 7 1 with the result that
262. See Id. at 8 1, 111 S.E. at 892. A powerful dissent protested that the majority's decision was inconsistent
with a long line of authority enforcing speculative contracts so long as illegal gambling is not involved. See id. at
82-97, 111 S.E. at 892-97 (Cothran, J., dissenting).
263. See Schmid v. Whitten, 114 S.C. 245, 103 S.E. 553 (1919).
264. If the plaintiff is the buyer, as in Schmid, specific performance allows him to acquire the land at the
contract price after a boom in land values. If the plaintiff is a seller who did not own the land at the time of
contract, as in Sumner, specific performance allows him to recover the contract price after acquiring the land at a
depressed price following the bust in real estate values.
265. See Sumner, 119 S.C. at 81, 111 S.E. at 892. In Schmid v. Whitten, the court relegated the plaintiff to
an action at law for damages. See Schmid, 114 S.C. at 252, 103 S.E. at 554. At law, the plaintiff would face a
risk that the jury might reflect the speculative fever in real estate in its assessment of damages. See supra text
accompanying notes 153-57.
266. 252 N.Y. 236, 169 N.E. 289 (1929), reargument denied, 252 N.Y. 616, 170 N.E. 164 (1930).
267. Id. at 238-40; 169 N.E. at 290.
268. Id. at 240, 169 N.E. at 290.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. For a very early case in which a court denied specific performance against a buyer of real estate, but
simultaneously allowed the seller to keep a downpayment, see Savile v. Savile, I P. Wis. 745, 24 Eng. Rep. 596
(Chancery 1721).
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Ratett was denied specific performance, but allowed to retain the
downpayment 27
The facts of Route 73 Bowling Center, Inc. v. Aristone2 73 justify a final
move along the remedial continuum to expectation damages. A realty company
(the plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest) leased premises in a bowling alley to the
defendant Aristone for the purpose of operating a tavern. The period of the
lease was indefinite except that the lessor had the right to terminate upon a sale
of the bowling alley. Upon termination of the lease, the lessor also had the right
to purchase Aristone's liquor license and the furnishings of his tavern for
$50,000. When the bowling alley was sold to the plaintiff, Aristone was notified
that the lease was terminated. The plaintiff tendered $50,000 for the liquor li-
cense pursuant to the agreement between its predecessor and Aristone. Upon
Aristone's refusal to transfer the license, the plaintiff sued for a declaratory
judgment that the contract was enforceable, but later amended its complaint to
seek specific performance and damages. The trial court denied both requests. 74
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the decision to deny
specific performance, citing a series of cases for the proposition that specific
performance may not be granted for a contract to sell a liquor license.27 5 New
Jersey had a policy of giving local alcoholic beverage control boards unfettered
discretion over the transfer and ownership of liquor licenses. 276 To order specific
performance would undermine that policy.
On the issue of damages, the court held that the trial court had erred in
denying plaintiff's alternative claim to monetary relief.271 To award damages
would not interfere with the local board's control of liquor licenses: Aristone
would remain the owner of the disputed license.278 As to the quantum of dam-
ages, the court stated that the plaintiff was entitled to the excess of the market
price of a liquor license over the contract price. 1 9
272. An alternative explanation for the monetary outcome in Kleinberg is an early precedent in New York
that a seller of real estate is entitled to retain a downpayment in the event of the buyer's wrongful refusal to
tender the remainder of the purchase price. See Lawrence v. Miller, 86 N.Y. 131 (1881). New York courts
continue to cite Lawrence in support of that result. See, e.g., Silva v. Celella, 153 A.D.2d 847, 848, 545 N.Y.S.2d
367, 368 (1989).
The court in Kleinberg did not rely on Lawrence in permitting Ratett to keep the downpayment. It is interest-
ing to speculate whether the court would have allowed Ratett to retain the entire payment if it exceeded expecta-
tion damages. The weaknesses in Ratett's case--nondisclosure of an apparently material fact and hardship on
Kleinberg-suggest that the court might have intervened affirmatively to prevent Ratett from being
overcompensated.
In its most recent consideration of the issue in a case involving a downpayment of 10% of the purchase price,
the New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed the Lawrence case, but pointedly noted that it was not deciding-and
expressed no view with respect to-the parties' rights regarding installment payments in excess of 10% of the
purchase price. See Maxton Builders, Inc. v. Lo Galbo, 68 N.Y.2d 373, 382 n.3, 502 N.E.2d 184, 189 n.3, 509
N.Y.S.2d 507, 512 n.3 (1986). The plaintiff's case in Maxton Builders suffered from none of the infirmities of
Ratett's in Kleinberg. A court is likely to be even more hesitant about allowing a seller whose case is flawed (like
Ratett) to retain a downpayment in excess of expectation damages.
273. 192 N.J. Super. 80, 469 A.2d 85 (1983).
274. Id. at 84, 469 A.2d at 87.
275. See id. at 83, 469 A.2d at 87.
276. See id. at 83-84, 469 A.2d at 87.
277. Id. at 84-85, 469 A.2d at 87-88.
278. Id. at 84, 469 A.2d at 87.
279. Id. at 85, 469 A.2d at 88.
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The court's formula for computing damages would assure the plaintiff the
benefit of the bargain by enabling it to acquire a liquor license in the market at
a net cost equal to the contract price.2"' In endorsing expectation damages, the
court emphasized that the plaintiff's claim to damages was no different from
other actions for breach of contract.281 Other than the public interest in control
of liquor licenses, no argument was made and no evidence was offered for deny-
ing specific performance or monetary relief. The plaintiff's predecessor had not
used questionable tactics in securing the lease, the parties had operated under
the lease without dispute for almost 20 years, the terms of the lease were appar-
ently fair, and there was no suggestion of mental or physical infirmity on the
part of Aristone. 8 2
C. Summary and Implications
The survey in the preceding section presented six cases in which specific
performance was denied on the ground of an equitable defense. The ultimate
monetary remedy awarded in these cases varied greatly, from restitution to full
280. Whether the plaintiff actually could acquire a liquor license would depend, of course, on the approval of
the local alcoholic beverage control board. But assuming that the board approved, an award of damages measured
by the market price/contract differential would enable the plaintiff to acquire a license with no financial loss
compared to the bargain. If, for example, the market price for liquor licenses is $75,000, the plaintiff would
recover $25,000 in damages (the excess of the market over the contract price). The plaintiff could then add the
damages to the contract price of $50,000 and acquire a license in the market for $75,000.
281. See Route 73, 192 N.J. Super. at 85, 469 A.2d at 88.
282. The outcome in Route 73 may be criticized on the ground that there was an implied condition in the
contract that the plaintiff get approval of the transfer from the alcoholic beverage control board. The plaintiff not
having obtained approval, the implied condition arguably was not satisfied and the defendant should have been
relieved from all liability under the contract, not just the obligation to perform specifically.
This argument is unpersuasive. If a condition of board approval is implied in the contract, it is proper also to
imply that Aristone would cooperate in obtaining approval or at least would do nothing to hinder the plaintiff in
obtaining approval. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRA.cTs § 205 (1981); id. § 245 comment a; id. § 245
illustration 4. Aristone's unwillingness to convey the license probably made it impossible for the plaintiff to apply
to the board for a transfer of the license. Certainly Aristone's repudiation impeded the plaintiff's chances of
obtaining the approval of the board. When a breach contributes materially to the nonoccurrence of a condition,
the nonoccurrence of the condition is excused. Id. § 245. Unless Aristone could prove that the plaintiff would have
failed to obtain board approval anyway, his repudiation excused the condition and relieved the plaintiff from a
duty to seek or obtain board approval. See id. § 245 comment b; id. § 245 illustrations 6 & 7; E. FARNSWORTH,
supra note 23, at 568 (upon repudiation, other party need "do nothing further to see that the condition occurs").
Because the condition to Aristone's obligation to tender the license was excused, the plaintiff was entitled to
recover damages for Aristone's repudiation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 245 comment a (1981)
(when condition is excused, performance of duty originally subject to its occurrence becomes due despite its non-
occurrence); id. § 245 illustration 4 (upon excuse of condition, plaintiff has claim for total breach).
The opinion in Route 73 may also be criticized for endorsing expectation damages rather than a specific
performance decree conditioned on the plaintiff's obtaining board approval. There are two reasons for preferring
an immediate award of expectancy damages. First, a conditional specific performance decree would reinstate a
condition already excused by Aristone's conduct. Having repudiated, Aristone is not entitled to another opportu-
nity to get out of the deal. Second, a conditional specific performance decree might be difficult to supervise be-
cause both parties would have to cooperate in attempting to obtain the approval of the board. Aristone's previous
behavior creates a risk that he will remain uncooperative and that the court may have to intervene affirmatively in
supervising its decree. An award of expectation damages measured by the difference between the market and
contract price is far simpler. See E. Yoruo, supra note 3, § 3.3.2, at 59 (courts sometimes refuse to enforce
contracts that are difficult to supervise or enforce). A court would probably be willing to undertake the added
burden of supervision if the innocent plaintiff preferred specific performance and was willing to take its chances on
board approval. See 1d. § 3.3.3, at 60-64 (compelling interest of injured party may lead court to undertake difficult
problems of supervision).
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benefit-of-the-bargain damages. Each remedy was responsive to the particular
circumstances of the case. Based on a survey of only six cases, it would be rash
to conclude that courts always use the discretion afforded by equitable defenses
to match the remedy to the facts. But a survey of selected cases can serve to
establish the benefits of a legal doctrine. By invoking a defense to specific per-
formance and by remaining sensitive to the reasons for denying the equitable
remedy, a court can proceed to do full justice between the parties by awarding
monetary relief appropriate in light of all the facts.2s 3
The case for retaining separate defenses to equitable relief has remained
obscure to virtually all modern commentators.2 84 There are three possible expla-
nations for this confusion. First, critics of equitable defenses have overlooked
the connection between equitable defenses and the availability of intermediate
remedies. Second, the historical distinction between law and equity has ob-
scured what is the real remedial choice in many cases. Often the reasons for
denying specific performance apply equally to benefit-of-the-bargain dam-
ages. 85 In such cases, the remedial choice is not between specific performance
and damages, but between a complete or partial remedy. Rather than simply
deny specific performance on the ground of an equitable defense, a court ought
to explain why both specific performance and expectation damages are im-
proper and why a lesser monetary remedy is appropriate. 2 6
This point seems to represent at least a partial concession to the critics of
equitable defenses. If the traditional distinction between law and equity ob-
scures the real issue in many cases, why not eliminate the distinction and focus
directly on what remedy is appropriate under the facts? There are two reasons
for hesitancy about abolishing the law-equity distinction in this context. First,
the plaintiff in certain cases may be entitled to expectancy damages, but not
specific performance. 217 Separate equitable defenses serve as an excellent vehi-
cle for denying one remedy, but not the other. Second, abolishing the law-equity
distinction may increase the risk that courts would treat defenses as all-or-noth-
ing propositions. If so, the price of eliminating the traditional equitable doctrine
may be lessened sensitivity and responsiveness. The risk would probably be
283. The need for judicial sensitivity to the facts may be further illustrated by considering a claim by the
plaintiff to the defendant's profit on reselling the subject matter of a contract to a third party. Some courts allow
the plaintiff to recover the resale profit if the plaintiff would be entitled to specific performance but for the resale.
See, e.g., Timko v. Useful Homes Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 433, 168 A. 824 (N.J. Ch. 1933). If the defendant has an
equitable defense (other than impossibility) to specific performance, she may argue that the defense also defeats
the buyer's derivative claim to disgorgement of the resale profit.
Although the defendant's argument has a certain formalistic appeal, the outcome is likely to depend on the
facts of the particular case. For example, in Hodge v. Shea, see supra text accompanying notes 224-34, the
plaintiff's misconduct would probably preclude him from recovering any profit made by the defendant upon resale
of the land in controversy. By contrast, the plaintiff in Route 73 Bowling Center, Inc. v. Aristone, see supra text
accompanying notes 273-82, would have a fairly potent claim to any profit if the defendant had resold the liquor
license because the plaintiff was not in any way responsible for the circumstances that gave rise to a defense to
specific performance.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39, 43-65.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 232-34, 246-47.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 235-51 (example of case in which specific performance and expecta-
tion damages were improper, but not lesser monetary award).
287. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94, 140-43, 275-82.
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worth taking if courts currently were misled by traditional doctrine into reach-
ing incorrect results. But they seem almost invariably to reach the right result
even while failing sometimes to present a cogent rationale.2 88
Judicial opinions that fail to explain candidly and persuasively why a mon-
etary remedy is appropriate despite the denial of specific performance289 may be
the third reason for the confusion among commentators about equitable de-
fenses. For an opinion to be convincing, it must contain a rationale for denying
equitable relief, an explanation of why that rationale does not preclude an alter-
native claim to monetary relief, and a justification of the particular remedy
awarded in terms of the facts. An opinion lacking any one of these elements is
likely to be misunderstood.
The risk of misunderstanding is particularly acute when courts use covert
tools to limit the plaintiff's monetary recovery. A good example is Hilton v.
Nelsen2 10 the case used early in this Article to dramatize the problems posed
by the existence of separate defenses to equitable relief.291 In denying specific
performance, the court catalogued a series of flaws in the bargaining process
and in the terms of the agreement so serious 92 that an unsophisticated reader
would wonder why the court proceeded to endorse a formula for computing
damages that seemed to ensure the plaintiff the monetary equivalent of per-
formance as damages.293 Two features of the opinion made it likely that the
amount of damages actually awarded would be far less. First, damages were to
be computed as of the date of breach rather than the date of judgment, 29'
thereby depriving the plaintiff-buyer of any interim appreciation in the value of
the property.295 Second, damages were likely to be assessed by a jury unsympa-
thetic to the buyer's claim. 2 8
The opinion does not reveal whether the court consciously decided to re-
duce the amount of the buyer's damages by endorsing a date-of-breach formula
and by authorizing a jury trial.29 7 Given the court's litany of objections to the
contract at issue, the remedy of expectation damages is difficult to defend unless
it is assumed that the court understood the effects of its other decisions in re-
ducing the amount of the buyer's recovery. Even under that assumption, the
opinion may be faulted for failing to offer a convincing rationale for a date-of-
288. See supra text accompanying notes 243-51.
289. For an example of a flawed judicial opinion, see infra text accompanying notes 290-300.
290. 283 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 1979).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 25-35.
292. See Hilton, 283 N.W.2d at 881-83 (contract drafted by the buyer containing extremely generous pay-
ment terms, seller's remedy limited to $2500, buyer given unilateral right to terminate for various reasons, and
contract misunderstood by seller who was not represented by a lawyer).
293. See id. at 884 n.5 (buyer may recover difference between market price and contract price as damages).
294. See id.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 102-07.
296. See Hilton, 283 N.W.2d at 884 (both parties given right to demand jury trial). See also supra text
accompanying notes 158-60.
297. The court insisted that both parties be given the right to demand a jury trial on the damages issue
despite their possible waiver of a jury trial below. See Hilton, 283 N.W.2d at 884. This suggests that the court
may have been aware of the importance of the issue. On the other hand, the court may have been unaware of the
implications of the date-of-breach formula. Its endorsement of the formula appears in a footnote and is qualified
by the court's refusal to hold that the formula was proper. See id. at 884 n.5.
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breach formula 98 or for a jury trial.2 99 The court had an obligation to write
that opinion not just in the interest of judicial candor, but to test the correctness
of its holding. If a persuasive opinion proved impossible to write, that fact might
be a sign that either the court's endorsement of expectation damages or its deci-
sion to reduce those damages covertly was wrong.300 In the absence of candor
and careful analysis, cases like Hilton give equitable defenses an undeservedly
bad reputation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Misconceptions due in part to unpersuasive judicial opinions have obscured
the actual role of equitable defenses in our legal system. It is incorrect to as-
sume that a plaintiff who is prevented by an equitable defense from obtaining
specific performance will recover its precise equivalent in damages. It is equally
wrong to assume that the same plaintiff will be deprived of any relief for the
breach. The actual consequences of defeat in equity are far more subtle and
complex. Between full benefit-of-the-bargain damages and rescission lies an ar-
ray of less extreme sequels to a successful equitable defense. An intermediate
outcome may result from the court's refusal to intervene on behalf of either
party,301 from the court's adoption of a particular remedy for the breach, 302
from the court's application of the mitigation or certainty doctrine,303 from the
trier-of-fact's discretion in assessing damages,30 4 or from the posture of negotia-
tions after (or in anticipation of) an equitable defense.30 5
298. Besides the equitable defenses, the court also relied on the buyer's investment motive in denying specific
performance, claiming that damages would be adequate because any other Minnesota farm land would serve as an
investment. See id. at 881. Proceeding from the adequacy rationale, the court may have tried to justify computing
damages as of the date of breach by comparing the buyer to other plaintiffs who, when damages are adequate, are
required to mitigate by buying substitute property on the date of breach. See supra text accompanying notes 84-
86.
But a buyer of real estate, like the plaintiff in Hilton, is normally entitled to specific performance. See -
Yoxso, supra note 3, § 10.2.1, at 264 (remedy against seller of real estate is normally specific performance). A
plaintiff who has a legitimate claim to specific performance cannot reasonably be expected to mitigate. See id. §
8.2.3.4, at 186 (mitigation requirement should be relaxed when the buyer has a "fair or plausible claim to specific
performance"); see also supra text accompanying notes 87-89. Because the buyer could not be expected to miti-
gate on the date of breach, damages should be computed as of the date of judgment to give him the benefit of the
bargain.
299. The court did give one reason for allowing both parties to demand a jury trial despite their possible
waivers in the court below by stating that a decision to deny specific performance "requires a new opportunity to
elect a jury trial." See Hilton, 283 N.W.2d at 884 n.6. The court cited no authority in support of that proposition.
If both parties were aware in the trial court that damages might be awarded in lieu of specific performance, it is
arguable that their waivers of a jury trial should continue to be binding on the damages issue.
300. It is possible that the opinion is a compromise between full benefit-of-the-bargain damages and no rem-
edy at all. Techniques for reaching a compromise-like a jury assessment of damages-may be useful in enabling
a court to avoid unfairness resulting from having to decide a case under an all-or-nothing legal rule. The court in
Hilton may have been unwilling to admit that it was adopting a compromise out of concern that lower courts
might be encouraged to compromise disputes rather than engage in arduous thinking about the facts or about the
merits of the opposing legal arguments. But the court's failure to write a persuasive opinion in support of a
compromise creates a risk that compromise might not be the correct result.
301. See supra text accompanying notes 266-72.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 235-51, 259-65, 273-82.
303. See supra text accompanying notes 90-107, 144-45.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 146-60.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 165-78.
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Seen in this light, equitable defenses invert the conventional wisdom that
equity is flexible and discretionary 0 and law is rigid and rule-bound.3 0 7 What
makes this area of the legal system especially responsive is the large array of
legal remedies available once the extreme remedy of specific performance is
denied on the ground of an equitable defense.3 08 Much of this flexibility would
be lost if legal and equitable defenses were equivalent. Separate equitable de-
fenses help the legal system accommodate a real world in which the facts often
do not support an either-or result, but something in-between.30 9 They can be
responsive to a weakness in the plaintiff's case, to the harshness of specific per-
formance on the defendant, or to a combination of factors that justify denying
equitable relief, but not rescinding the contract in its entirety.
306. Cf. Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE LJ. 1373, 1381 (1986)
(equity finds "a unique solution to each unique problem").
307. See Laycock, Book Review, 45 Bus. LAW. 1377, 1378 (1990) (reviewing E. YORIO, CONTRACT EN-
FORCEMENT: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS (1989)).
308. See Yorio, supra note 3, at 1405-24 (survey of situations in which flexibility of money damages enables
courts to reach the right result).
309. The existence of separate equitable defenses may not be absolutely essential to the process of matching
the remedy to the facts. But abolishing the traditional distinction between law and equity may lead courts to treat
defenses as all-or-nothing propositions with a consequent loss in judicial sensitivity and responsiveness. See supra
text accompanying notes 287-88.
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